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ABSTRACT 
 
We study whether cross-country differences in regulations have affected international 
bank flows. We find strong evidence that banks have transferred funds to markets with fewer 
regulations. This form of regulatory arbitrage suggests there may be a destructive “race to the 
bottom” in global regulations which restricts domestic regulators’ ability to limit bank 
risk-taking.  However, we also find that the links between regulation differences and bank 
flows are significantly stronger if the recipient country is a developed country with strong 
property rights and creditor rights.  This suggests that while differences in regulations have 
important influences, that without a strong institutional environment, lax regulations are not 
enough to encourage massive capital flows.         
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1. Introduction 
The rapid increase in international banking and financial flows represents one of the most 
remarkable developments in the world economy over the past decade.  According to statistics from 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),1 international banks’ foreign claims increased from 1.12 
trillion dollars in 1987 to 34 trillion dollars in 2007, suggesting that the international banking system 
is becoming a more important conduit for the transfer of capital across countries (McGuire and 
Tarashev, 2008). 
Despite the large level of international bank flows, and despite recent attempts to increase the 
global coordination of bank regulation, much of the bank regulation and supervision remains national. 
Given this environment, it is reasonable to presume that cross-country differences in banking 
regulations may encourage the flow of bank capital from markets that are heavily regulated to those 
markets that are less regulated. In one respect, this cross-country “regulatory competition” may enable 
banks to effectively evade costly regulations, which improves capital market efficiency and enhances 
global economic growth.  Notwithstanding these potential benefits, there is a fear that this 
“regulatory competition” should more appropriately be viewed as a form of “regulatory arbitrage” that 
creates a “race to the bottom” which enables banks to circumvent prudent regulations and take 
excessive risks (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, p.68). Given the interconnected nature of the 
financial markets and institutions, these types of regulatory arbitrage activities might expose all 
jurisdictions to the influence of excessive risk taking.2  
  Not surprisingly, these issues have received renewed attention in the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis3. Moreover, the global crisis has spurred widespread calls for increased regulation and 
has also led both academics and practitioners to reaffirm the need for global coordination in bank 
                                                             
1 The BIS monitors foreign claims  held by banks from OECD countries vis-a`-vis the rest of the world .These 
claims represent banks’ financial claims extended on residents outside the country in which these banks are 
headquartered. The claims consist of financial assets such as loans, debt securities, properties, and equities, 
including equity participations in subsidiaries (BIS, 2003). 
2 Reflecting these concerns about regulatory arbitrage, Acharya, Wachtel and Walter (2009, p.370) argue:  
“This will end up conferring substantial guarantees to the financial sector, giving rise to excessive leverage- and 
risk-taking incentives in spite of substantial regulation in each country.”  Echoing these concerns, Naoyuki 
Shinohara, IMF's Deputy Managing Director, stated that:, “It is important to ensure a level playing field in 
regulation. Global coordination is needed to reap the benefits of global finance while minimizing the scope for 
regulatory arbitrage, which could be damaging to global financial stability". 
3 Indeed, as Knight (2009) points out, financial firms tend to take advantage of the regulatory gaps by engaging 
in regulatory arbitrage during the pre-crisis credit cycle upswing from 2002 to 2007, which made the financial 
system much less robust to shocks. 
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regulation. 4  For instance, the Basel Cross Border Resolution Group issued a report and 
recommendations on international coordination of bank regulation in March 2010 (BIS, 2010). IMF 
also issued a proposal “Resolution of Cross Border Banks-a Proposed Framework for Enhanced 
Coordination” in June 2010 (IMF, 2010). Despite the importance of these issues, to the best of our 
knowledge, no existing study has comprehensively examined the regulatory arbitrage incentives 
related to international bank flows.5  This historical omission is not altogether surprising because of 
the lack of available detailed data regarding cross-country bank regulations. However, recent global 
bank regulation surveys conducted by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004, 2006, 2008) help overcome 
this data availability issue. Utilizing this survey data to measure cross-country differences in banking 
regulations, our paper sets out to explore the extent to which regulatory arbitrage has taken place, and 
if so, its impact on global lending.   
To address this issue, we take an in-depth look at global bank flows from 26 source countries to 
120 recipient countries over the past decade. In testing for regulatory arbitrage, we explore whether 
differences in bank regulations have influenced the flow of bank capital across markets.  Controlling 
for a large number of economic, legal and institutional factors that are likely to influence 
cross-country bank loans, we consider the effects of a wide range of banking regulations.   
Our results strongly indicate that bank flows are positively related to the both the number of 
activity restrictions and the stringency of capital regulation imposed on banks in their source country, 
and negatively related to restrictions and regulations in the recipient country.   Drilling further down, 
we consider the effects of specific regulations including restrictions on whether banks may own 
nonfinancial firms, the extent to which the bank supervisory authority is independent from the 
government, the degree of audit and disclosure transparency and the degree of power exerted by the 
supervisory authority.  In each case, we find evidence that capital tends to flow from more restrictive 
to less restrictive jurisdictions.  
These results appear to be robust to various time periods and various specifications.  While we 
                                                             
4 Morrison and White (2009) also address these issues in a theoretical context where they consider the costs and 
benefits of coordinated multinational regulation.   
5 A much broader literature has examined the economic effects of cross-country differences in regulation and 
liberalization.  See for example, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2005), Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006), Laeven and Levine (2009) and Fernandes, Lei and Miller 
(2010) 
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consistently find a strong association between the regulatory environment and bank flows, there is 
always the possibility of reverse causality where regulations endogenously respond to changes in 
capital market flows.  While these econometric problems are common throughout the literature and 
difficult to complete eliminate (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) for an excellent discussion 
of these issues) we take a variety of steps to alleviate these concerns.  In particular, we follow the 
literature (e.g. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad and Siegel, 2007) 
and control for exogenous measures of growth opportunities in our regression models, we use the 
fixed effect estimations to account for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics that may 
influence international bank flows, we estimate a series of models using instrumental variables, and 
we examine the effect of changes in bank regulations on changes of international bank flows.  In 
each case, the main findings are upheld. 
 Furthermore, looking beyond just capital market flows, we also explore whether differences in 
regulations influence banks’ decisions to establish foreign operation.  Using bank level data across 
the 26 source countries6, we find strong evidence that regulatory gaps in activity restriction, capital 
regulation, supervisory independence and strength, external audit, disclosure transparency and loan 
classification exert significant impacts on banks’ foreign expansion decisions. Overall, the bank level 
evidence strongly bolsters the findings that banks headquartered in more restrictive jurisdictions are 
more likely to establish a branch or subsidiary in the countries with lighter regulations. 
Put together, all of these findings suggest that a form of regulatory arbitrage is taking place, and 
that banks tend to move funds to markets with fewer regulations7.  More generally, our findings 
indicate that global banking regulations and the coordination of regulations across different markets 
have an important influence on the level of bank funding.  On one level, it is not surprising that 
banks would want to take steps to avoid regulations.  However, there are countervailing reasons why 
bank capital would not necessarily flock to low regulated markets, particularly if these countries do 
not have strong institutional and legal environments.  Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in 
                                                             
6 Using the Bankscope database, we compiled an original database on the operations of 301 large banks with 
headquarters in one of the 26 source countries covered in the BIS statistics, focusing on their foreign presence 
(i.e. branch or subsidiary) in 120 countries (i.e. the recipient countries in the BIS statistics) around the world. 
7 There exist some other types of regulatory arbitrage activities. For instance, banks exploited credit transfer 
mechanisms through setting up off-balance-sheet asset-back commercial paper conduits (ABCP) and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) and increased their effective leverage (Acharya et al., 2009).  
5 
 
some circumstances strong regulations are prudent and may serve as a signal of quality and stability.8   
To further disentangle these effects, we conduct a series of additional tests where we explore 
whether the level of economic development and the legal and institutional environment influence the 
degree of regulatory arbitrage.  Here we find that cross-country differences in regulations have a 
much more profound effect on bank flows if the recipient country has an advanced economy, strong 
creditor rights, strong property rights and a high degree of information sharing among investors.    
By confirming the importance of establishing a strong legal and institutional environment, these 
findings mitigate concerns of a possible “race to the bottom”, to the extent they suggest that low 
regulations in isolation are not enough to attract capital. More negatively, our results suggest that even 
after controlling for these effects, banks do engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage.  These actions 
may undercut attempts to limit risk-taking in the aftermath of the current crisis, unless policymakers 
are able to take the difficult steps to enhance the global coordination of banking regulations (Acharya, 
Wachtel and Walter, 2009).      
Overall, we believe our results make an important contribution to two related literatures.  First, 
our results contribute to the literature on international banking regulations (e.g. Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 2004, 2006; 2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Beck, Levine and Levkov, 2010; 
Houston, Lin, Lin, Ma, 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Morrison, and White, 2009) by 
demonstrating the importance that these regulations have on the flow of bank capital across borders.  
To the extent our results highlight the need for regulatory coordination, we believe they also offer 
some insights to policymakers and regulators looking to rebuild the global regulatory architecture 
following the recent crisis. Second, our results add to the literature that has focused on the 
determinants of global bank activities (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzlo, 2001; La Porta, Lopex-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, 2002; Buch, 2003; Mian, 2006; Sengupta, 2007; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2010; Lin, 
Ma, Malatesta, Xuan, 2011 a&b, Pang, Spint and Tice, 2010), by demonstrating the important effects 
that global banking regulations have on capital market flows. In this regard, we also contribute to the 
broader literature on the determinants of global capital flows (e.g. Gelos and Wei, 2005; Alfaro, 
                                                             
8 For example, in a different setting, Fernandes, Lei and Miller (2010) explored the impact of a recent change in 
SEC guidelines which made it easier for foreign firms to avoid US guidelines regarding investor protections and 
disclosure.  They showed that foreign firms operating in countries with weak investor protections saw a 
significant decline in their stock prices following the regulatory change, whereas there was no significant 
change in countries with strong investor protections. 
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Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych, 2008; Papaioannou, 2009).The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  
Section 2 describes the data used and presents a wide range of summary statistics.  Section 3 explore 
the causes of global bank flows, and demonstrate the various channels in which regulatory systems in 
different markets affect the flow of foreign bank capital.  Section 4 considers the impacts of 
regulatory difference across countries on bank foreign expansion decisions.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
2.1. Data sources 
Our study compiles data from four main sources: 
(1) The International Banking Statistics published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
provides data regarding the international flow of bank loans and portfolio investments from 26 
primarily OECD source countries to 120 recipient countries on a quarterly basis since December 1983. 
The BIS Consolidated/Nationality Banking Statistics publish foreign financial claims reported by 
domestic bank head offices, including the exposures of their foreign affiliates (i.e. branches and 
subsidiaries), and are collected on a worldwide consolidated basis after netting out  inter-office 
positions (BIS, 2003, p.55). These claims comprise financial assets such as loans, debt securities, 
properties, and equities -- including equity participations in subsidiaries (BIS, 2003). The data are 
published in Table 9B of the BIS Quarterly Review regularly under the title, “The consolidated 
foreign claims of reporting banks”9.   
This database provides comprehensive data on banks’ financial claims extended on residents 
outside the country in which these banks are headquartered. It is important to stress that the bank’s 
home country is determined by the reporting bank’s nationality not its geographic location. So, for 
example, a loan issued by the US bank located in London to a British bank operating in London is 
recorded in the database as a foreign loan, where the source country is the US and the recipient 
country is the UK.  However, a loan issued by the same US bank located in London to another US 
bank located in New York is regarded as a domestic loan issued by the US bank and is therefore not 
recorded in this database (for details, see Wooldridge, 2002).  
(2) The Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (DMS henceforth - 2007) and World Bank “Doing Business” 
                                                             
9 A more detailed discussion about the data can be found in the Data Appendix. 
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datasets provide information regarding creditor rights and information sharing measures in 129 
countries during the past 30 years. More specifically, DMS (2007) dataset contains historical data on 
creditor rights and information sharing across 120 countries over the period 1978-2003 and “Doing 
Business” dataset contains more recent data updated annually. 
(3) The Barth, Caprio, and Levine (BCL henceforth) (2004, 2006, 2008) dataset on bank regulation, 
supervision and monitoring in more than 100 countries. The database is compiled from three 
worldwide surveys of bank regulation and supervision among financial regulators. The original survey, 
Survey I, was conducted in 117 countries in year 1998. The first update in 2003, Survey II, 
characterized the regulatory situation at the end of 2002, and covered 152 countries. Survey III was 
conducted in 2005 and 2006 and covered 142 countries. The surveys contain more than 300 questions 
on various aspects such as capital regulation, entry regulation, activities restrictions, supervisory 
power and independence, external governance and monitoring.  Overall, the three surveys plot a very 
detailed and comprehensive picture of global bank supervision and regulation over the past decade. 
(4) The BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings. The BankScope 
database has comprehensive coverage in most countries and accounts for over 90% of all banking 
assets in each country. Each bank report contains detailed balance sheet and income statement 
totalling up to 200 data items and 36 pre-calculated financial ratios. Using the Bankscope database, 
we compiled an original database on the operations of 301 large banks with headquarters in one of the 
26 source countries covered in the BIS statistics, focusing on their foreign presence (i.e. branch or 
subsidiary) in 120 countries (i.e. the recipient countries in the BIS statistics) around the world. Due to 
the data availability on subsidiary and branch information, we focus on the most recent year in our 
analysis. The bank level accounting information is also obtained from the database.  
In addition to the four main datasets mentioned above, we utilize a variety of other data sources. 
Specifically, we use the World Development Indicator (WDI, 2008) for macroeconomic control 
variables such as GDP per capita, population, and area. The common language dummy variable that 
equals one if the two countries share a common language or have former colonial relation is from 
Rose (2004). The financial market development index is from the Database on Financial Development 
and Structure constructed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) and it is updated regularly by 
its authors.  We also used the index of financial liberation that was constructed by Abiad, 
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Detragiache and Tressel (2010), and we followed the approach by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and 
Siegel (2007) to construct the country level exogenous growth opportunity measure.   
 Tables 1 and 2 summarize these data sources and provide brief descriptions and summary 
statistics of the key variables. Below, we provide a quick overview of each of these key variables.  A 
more detailed description can be found in the Internet Appendix.  
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
2.2. International Bank Flows 
The international bank flow measure is the main dependent variable in our analysis. This variable 
captures the bank capital inflows from banks located in source country s to all sectors of the economy 
in recipient country r from year t-1 to t. As there is no flow measure in the BIS data, we construct a 
bank flow measure by calculating the annual percentage change in total foreign claims for each 
source-recipient combination.  More specifically, our main dependent variable is defined as 100 
times the log-difference of total foreign claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, 
that is, 100*∆ln FCsr. After merging different databases and deleting the missing observations, our 
sample covers international bank flow from 26 “source” countries10 to 120 “recipient” countries from 
1996 to 2007. We construct the annual bank flow variable by using the stock data on December of 
each year in the sample period to match the annual frequency of the other explanatory variables11. As 
can be seen from Table 2, the sample mean of bank flow is 2.89, which suggests that the average bank 
flows from the source country to the recipient country in our sample increase by 2.9% a year over the 
sample period. The standard deviation of the bank flows is 11.32, suggesting a great variation in 
international bank flow over time and across countries. 
 
2.3. Bank regulation and Supervision 
 We use a set of variables from the three worldwide surveys conducted by Barth, Caprio and 
Levine over the past decade (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, 2008) to measure various aspects of 
                                                             
10 The 26 source countries/regions with available BIS bank flow data are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
11 We reduce the impact of outliers by trimming the bank flows outside the range between -100% and +100%. 
That reduced our sample size by about 6%. 
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bank regulation and supervision across countries.  These variables include two measures regarding 
restrictions on activities (Activities Restrictiveness and Bank Own Non-financial Firms), and a 
measure related to capital stringency (Capital Regulatory Index).  We also use two variables to 
measure the strength of external auditors and financial statement transparency (Strength of External 
Audit and Financial Statement Transparency) two variables that are designed to measure the strength 
and independence of bank supervisors (Official Supervisory Power and Supervisory Independence) as 
well as a measure of the stringency in classifying loans that are in arrears (Loan Classification 
Lenience).  Since the data span over the past decade, we focus on the time period 1996-2007.  
Specifically, the values of regulatory variables for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first 
survey recorded in 1998/1999. The values of regulatory variables for the period of 2000 to 2003 are 
taken from the second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of the end of 2002. The 
regulatory measures for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third survey that was recorded 
in 2005/2006. The detailed constructions and definitions of these variables can be found in Table 1. 
 
2.4. Institutional Controls 
Previous studies (e.g. Alfaro et al., 2008; Papaioannou, 2009) highlight the important of 
institutional quality in driving the internal bank flows. We therefore control for the institutional 
difference between source and recipient countries using three sets of institutional variables regarding 
the level of creditor rights, information sharing and property rights.  
We use the creditor rights index first established by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (LLSV henceforth - 1998), as a measure of the powers of secured creditors in bankruptcy. The 
index has been widely used in recent studies in finance literature (e.g. Houston et al., 2010; Acharya, 
Amihud and Litov, 2011). The level of information sharing among creditors is also likely to have an 
important influence on banks’ willingness to provide foreign capital. Based on the data available from 
DMS (2007) and the World Bank “Doing Business” dataset, we construct a variable (Information 
Sharing), which indicates the contents of the credit information sharing through a public registry or 
private bureau.  As a measure of property rights, we use the Legal Structure and Security of Property 
Rights index from the World Economics Freedom report constructed by the Economic Freedom 
Network.  These institutional distance measures are panel data across 120 countries since the 1990s. 
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Once again, detailed constructions and definitions of these variables can be found in Table 1 
 
2.5. Other Country Controls 
We also include several country-level variables to control for differences in economic 
development, institutions, and cultures across source-recipient country pairs. First, we control for the 
contract enforcement in both the source country and recipient country. The contract enforcement 
measures the average duration counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until 
the creditors obtain payments. The proxy variable was first developed by Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopex-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), and have been updated in the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business’ database. In addition, we include real GDP per capita in US dollar to capture the 
economic development of the region/country. Third, we include the natural logarithm of population 
and area to capture the size of the market. Fourth, we include the common language dummy variable, 
which equals one if the two countries share a common language (Rose, 2004), to control for cultural 
and language differences between source and recipient countries. Furthermore, we include two 
variables to measure the banking sector structure in recipient countries. Banking Concentration is the 
share of the five largest banks in total bank deposits. Government Bank Ownership is the fraction of 
the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by state government. State 
controlled banking sector with high concentration might deter the foreign banks from entering the 
market. Lastly, we also control for the geographical distance between the source and recipient 
countries to capture potential impacts of geographical distance on bank flow. To alleviate the concern 
that the empirical results are driven by some broader policy changes or the changes of growth 
opportunities, we also control for country wide financial liberalization (Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel, 2010) and exogenous growth opportunities (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005, 2007) in a 
smaller subsample.  
 There is a concern that international bank flows might respond to “permanent income” shocks 
(e.g. productivity shocks) at the country level, and the institutions and regulations are partly shaped by 
these shocks as well. If this is the case, the observed relation between regulation and international 
bank flows might be spurious. To address this concern, we examined a correlation matrix of the key 
independent variables.  We found that the change of income is not significantly associated with the 
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changes of bank regulations and institutions, alleviating the concern of spurious correlation 
coefficients. To further address this concern, we control for income effects in all the regression 
analyses.12 
 
3. Empirical Results: Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows 
3.1. Regulation, Institution and Bank Inflows/Outflows 
 In this section, we empirically test for regulatory arbitrage, relying on the three worldwide 
surveys conducted over the past decade by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006, 2008).  Specifically, the 
values of regulatory variables for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first survey recorded 
in 1998/1999, the values of regulatory variables for the period of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the 
second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of the end of 2002, and the regulatory measures 
for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third survey that was recorded in 2005/200613. To 
help understand the various factors that influence cross-country bank flows, we construct a series of 
incremental tests.  In these tests, we first isolate the factors influencing capital inflows into the 
recipient countries, and then separately examine the factors that influence the level of outflows from 
the source countries.  In the subsequent sub-section, we will construct a gravity model that combines 
these effects by exploring the specific connections between source and recipient countries.   
To examine the relation between bank regulation in recipient countries and bank capital inflows, 
we construct for each year, an aggregate bank inflow measure for each recipient country.   We use 
this aggregate bank inflow measure as the dependent variable and estimate the following regression:  
 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡         (1) 
 
where r and t respectively indicate the recipient country and time (year).  The dependent variable 
Bank Flow is defined as 100 times the log-difference (from t-1 to t) of the aggregate total foreign 
claims (FCsr) from the 26 source countries to recipient country r.  The independent variables include 
                                                             
12 This complete correlation matrix is included in the accompanying Internet Appendix (Appendix Table 1). 
13 We tried some alternative ways in assigning the values such as moving all the thresholds one year before or 
later and found the results quite robust. In addition, we also tried longer time period and found consistent results. 
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a number of bank regulation and institution variables from the recipient countries. The regulatory 
variables include measures of activity restrictiveness, capital regulation, external audit, information 
disclosure, and supervisory power and independence, the details of which were discussed in Section 2. 
The institutional quality measures include the creditor rights index, the property rights index and the 
information sharing variable. The vector X include standard controls such as GDP per capita, 
population and the country’s land area.  In addition, we also include recipient country (𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟) fixed 
effects and time fixed effect (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡). In addition, the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the recipient country level are used in computing p -values. The estimated results from this model 
are reported in columns (1) to (6) in Table 3A. 
[Table 3A here] 
The results suggest that less stringent bank regulations in the recipient country induce more bank 
inflows. Looking more closely, we find that a higher level of activities restrictiveness in the recipient 
country discourages bank inflows. Holding other things constant, a recipient country with the lowest 
level of activity restriction in our sample is likely to attract 2.61% higher bank inflow (on an annual 
basis) relative to the recipient country with the highest level of activity restrictiveness. A one unit 
increase in Restriction on Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms in the source country results in a decrease 
the bank inflow growth by 0.86%. Considering the sample mean (2.89%) of the annual bank flow 
growth rate, the effects are economically important.  
 Moreover, we find that more stringent capital regulations are negatively associated with bank 
inflow growth in recipient countries. We also find that Strength of External Audit and Financial 
Statement Transparency are negatively associated with bank inflows into the recipient countries. A 
one standard deviation increase in Financial Statement Transparency index is associated with a 
decrease in bank inflow growth rate by 1.23%. Considering the sample mean (2.89%) of the annual 
bank flow growth rate, the effect is not trivial. Overall, the evidence suggests that higher information 
disclosure standards and stronger external governance tend to deter bank capital inflows. In addition, 
we find that the Independence of Supervisory Authority and Official Supervisory Power measures are 
negatively associated with bank inflows. The presence of an independent supervisor, for instance, is 
associated with a 1.25% decrease in bank inflow growth. The evidence suggests that bank capitals 
tend to flow into countries with less independent and weaker supervisory authority. We also find that 
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loan classification leniency encourages bank inflows. 
 The measures of institutional quality also exert important influences on bank capital inflows. We 
find that information sharing, creditor rights and property rights protection in recipient countries are 
positively and significantly associated with bank capital inflows. For instance, a one standard 
deviation increase in Creditor Rights is associated with a 6% increase in the annual growth rate of 
bank inflows. Furthermore, we find better contract enforcement in the recipient country also helps 
attract more bank inflows. Overall, the evidence indicates the importance of legal environment and 
investor protection in determining international bank flows. 
 Arguably, the international bank flows could also be driven by other important macro factors 
such as financial liberalization and growth opportunities. In order to alleviate the omitted variable 
concern, we include two additional controls in our baseline regression models. The first index is from 
a financial liberalization dataset compiled by Abiad, Destragiache and Tressel (2010). The index 
contains various dimensions including credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate 
liberalization, entry barriers, capital account restrictions, privatization, and securities market policies 
and supervision. The dataset covers 91 countries across the sample period 1973-2005. A higher value 
indicates a higher degree of financial liberalization. The second index is a growth opportunity index, 
that is constructed using the approaches outlined by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007).  Intuitively, each country is viewed as a composition 
of sectors each with time-varying growth opportunities, which are reflected in the P/E ratios (price to 
earnings ratios) of global industry portfolios (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005).  Following 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), an annual measure is constructed based on the 3-digit SIC 
industry composition for each country and weighted by their output shares according to UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics Database. As Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad and Siegel (2007) point out, this 
measure of exogenous growth helps address many of the endogeneity concerns in the cross country 
finance and growth literature.  
After including these two new controls, the sample size drops to 642 (columns 7). However, all 
the main findings remain significant and robust. Moreover, we find that both Financial Liberalization 
and Growth Opportunities are associated with a higher bank inflow growth rate. In column (8), we 
re-estimate the regressions using weighted OLS regressions (the results are weighted by the size of the 
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recipient countries measured by GDP in USD). As can be seen from the table, the empirical results 
remain highly robust. 
 Next we turn our attention to the factors that influence bank outflows.  Here, we aggregate the 
bank outflow data from each source country to 120 recipient countries in a specific year and construct 
a source country/year aggregate bank outflow measure. We use this aggregate bank outflow measure 
as the dependent variable and estimate the following regression:  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝐼𝐼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡         (2) 
where s and t indicate the source country and time (year), respectively. The dependent variable Bank 
Flow is defined as 100 times the log-difference (i.e. difference in log from t-1 to t) of aggregate total 
foreign claims (FCsr) from a source country s to 120 recipient countries. The key independent 
variables are the same measure of bank regulation, institutional quality and other controls used above, 
but now we capture these measures from the source countries.  We also include source country (𝜑𝜑𝐼𝐼) 
fixed effects and time fixed effect (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡). In addition, the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the source country level are used in computing p-values. The estimated results from this 
model are reported in columns (1) to (6) in Table 3B. In column (7), we further include Financial 
Liberalization and Growth Opportunities as additional control variables to address the potential 
omitted variable concern. The sample size drops from 238 to 181. In column (8), we re-estimate the 
regressions using source country size weighted OLS regressions and test the robustness of the results. 
[Table 3B here] 
As can be seen from the table, the results are highly consistent with our previous findings. Specifically, 
we find that Overall Activities Restrictions and Restriction on Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms are 
associated with a higher growth rate of bank capital outflows. In other words, higher level of activities 
restrictiveness in the source country encourages bank outflows. We also find that capital stringency, 
financial statement transparency and the strength of external audit are all positively associated with 
bank outflow growth.  Likewise, we find that bank capital tends to flow from countries with more 
independent and powerful supervisory authority to countries with less independent and weaker 
supervisory authority.  Moreover, loan classification leniency tends to discourage bank outflows.  
The institutional quality also significantly affects bank capital outflows. The measures related to 
15 
 
information sharing, creditor rights and property rights protection in source countries are negatively 
and significantly associated with bank capital outflows. Moreover, we find better contract 
enforcement in the recipient country also helps reduce bank outflows. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that higher institutional quality discourages bank outflows. 
 Next to get a more visual sense about the relation between regulation and bank inflows out 
outflows, we constructed a series of non-parametric (kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing) 
plots of the relation between regulatory changes and the changes of bank inflow (outflow) growth in 
recipient (source) countries. As Barth et al. (2008) point out, a large number of bank regulatory 
changes have occurred in various countries over the past decade. In Appendix Figure 1, we follow 
Barth et al. (2008) to make comparisons on bank activities restrictiveness in year 1999 (using Survey I) 
and year 2006 (using Survey III). A change in a positive direction indicates a move towards greater 
restrictiveness. As can be seen, most countries tightened restrictions during the past decades. The 
activities restrictiveness in many developing countries such as Vietnam, Nicaragua, Dominica 
Republic, and Costa Rica increased dramatically over the past decade. At the same time, restrictions 
have eased in some countries such as Mexico, Belgium, Oman, and Romania14. Overall, among the 
120 recipient countries in our sample, we find that 114 recipient countries/regions have changed at 
least one type of regulations during the past decade. Among the 26 source countries in our sample, we 
find that 21 countries/regions have changed at least one type of regulations during the past decade. In 
Figure 1, we present the non-parametric plots with the changes in regulations of recipient countries on 
the X-axis, and changes in bank inflow growth on the Y-axis. In Figure 2, we present the 
non-parametric plots with the changes in regulations of source countries on the X-axis, and changes in 
bank outflow growth on the Y-axis. We focus on the three survey years (1999, 2002, and 2005) to 
measure the regulatory changes. To capture the potential lagged effects of regulatory changes, we use 
bank flow data in years 2001, 2004, and 2007 data to measure the changes in bank flows. 
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 These plots largely confirm our findings in the regression analyses. In Figure 1, we find a 
negative relation between the changes in various dimensions of bank regulation (i.e. overall activities 
                                                             
14 There are also significant changes on other dimensions of regulation such as capital regulatory stringency, 
financial statement transparency, official supervisory power and loan classification leniency. Please see Barth et 
al. (2008) for detailed discussions and comparisons. 
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restrictiveness, restriction on banks own non-financial firms, capital regulatory stringency, strength of 
external audit, financial statement transparency, independence of supervisory authority and official 
supervisory power) and the changes of bank inflows. In Figure 2, we find a positive relation be 
between the changes in various dimensions of bank regulation (i.e. overall activities restrictiveness, 
restriction on banks own non-financial firms, capital regulatory stringency, strength of external audit, 
financial statement transparency, independence of supervisory authority and official supervisory 
power) and the changes of bank outflows. Moreover, we find a negative relation between the changes 
in loan classification leniency and the changes of bank outflows. Taken together, these plots lend 
credence to our regression findings, provide assurance that the results are not driven by a few outliers 
and at the same time, perhaps provide a clearer picture of the links between regulations and capital 
market flows.   
 
3.2. Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows: Gravity Model 
In this section, we combine the “push” and “pull” effects on international bank flows and 
estimate the following standard “gravity” model with country and time fixed effects.  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +                          𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾2𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +                        𝜃𝜃1 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵�𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟� + 𝜃𝜃2𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 + η𝐼𝐼 + 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡         (3)          
where s and r indicate the source and recipient country, respectively, and t indicates time (year). The 
dependent variable Bank Flow is defined as 100 times the log-difference of the ratio of total foreign 
claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). The key 
independent variables are the same measures of the regulatory environment, institutional quality and 
other controls used earlier but now we include these variables from both the source and recipient 
countries. In addition, two other measures are now included.   Potential information frictions and 
transaction costs are captured by the logged distance between the source and recipient countries. 
Common language is included to control for potential cultural and language differences between the 
source and recipient countries. In addition, we also include source country (η𝐼𝐼) and recipient country 
(𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟) fixed effects to capture the time-invariant country-specific characteristics in the source and 
recipient countries, respectively. The model also includes a time fixed effect (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡) In addition, the 
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heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the recipient country level are used in computing 
pt-values. The estimated results from this model are reported in columns (1) to (6) in Table 4. After 
excluding the missing observations, the sample size is about 14,000 observations. In column (7), we 
further include Financial Liberalization and Growth Opportunities as additional controls to address 
the potential omitted variable concern. The sample size drops to 7923. In column (8), we employ the 
panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator described in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2001) to accommodate heteroskedasticity both across countries and across time and correlation 
between country residuals (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005) and test the robustness of the results. 
As can be seen from the table, the empirical results remain highly robust to the GMM estimation. 
[Table 4 here] 
 Table 4 provides strong evidence the bank capital flows from heavily regulated markets to those 
markets that are more lightly regulated. Specifically, we find that a lower level of activities 
restrictiveness in the recipient country induces more bank inflows while higher level of overall 
activities restrictiveness in the source country encourages more bank capital outflows. Holding other 
things constant, a recipient country with the lowest level of activity restriction in our sample is likely 
to attract 2.25% higher bank inflow (on an annual basis) relative to the recipient country with the 
highest level of activity restrictiveness. A one unit increase in Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms in the 
source country results in a 1.3% increase in bank outflow growth; a one unit increase in Bank Owning 
Nonfinancial Firms in the recipient country decreases the bank inflow growth by 1.97%. Considering 
the sample mean (2.89%) of the annual bank flow growth rate, the effects are economically important.  
 Regarding capital regulation, we find that capital regulatory stringency is positively associated 
with bank outflow growth in source countries and negatively associated with bank inflow growth in 
recipient countries. A one standard deviation increase (1.78) in the Capital Regulatory Index increases 
the bank outflow growth by 1.05% in the source country and decrease the bank inflow growth by 
0.77% in the recipient country. In short, the evidence indicates that bank capital tend to flow from 
markets with more stringent capital regulation to the markets with lower capital regulatory stringency. 
 We also find that bank capital flows from countries with higher information disclosure standards 
and stronger external audit to countries with weak disclosure and audit. Specifically, the Strength of 
External Audit and Financial Statement Transparency are positively associated with bank outflows in 
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the source country and negatively associated with bank inflow in the recipient country. A one standard 
deviation increase in Financial Statement Transparency in the source country results in a 1.6% 
increase in bank outflow growth; a one standard deviation increase in Financial Statement 
Transparency in the recipient country decrease the bank inflow growth by 0.93%. In some 
specifications, however, the coefficients are marginally significant or insignificant. 
 With respect to bank supervision, we find that bank capitals flow from countries with more 
independent and powerful supervisory authority to countries with less independent and weaker 
supervisory authority. A one standard deviation increase in Official Supervisory Power in the source 
country results in a 1.29% increase in bank outflow growth; a one standard deviation increase in 
Official Supervisory Power in the recipient country decrease the bank inflow growth by 1.15%. We 
also find that supervisor independence in the recipient country tends to discourage international bank 
inflows while the effect of supervisor independence in the source country is only marginally 
significant. A one unit increase in Supervisory Independence in the recipient country decreases the 
bank inflow growth by 0.65%. Moreover, we find that bank capital tends to flow from countries with 
stringent loan classification systems to countries with more lenient loan classification systems. 
Overall, the empirical results show that banks do take advantage of regulatory gaps across countries 
and that bank capital flows from markets that are heavily regulated to those markets with less activity 
restrictions, lower stringency in capital regulation, weak external audit and disclosure transparency, 
lower entry barriers, weak supervisory authority and lenient loan classification criteria. 
 Consistent with the literature, the institutional distance between source and recipient countries 
exerts a very significant impact on international bank flows. On the one hand, we find that better 
information sharing, stronger creditor rights protection and property rights protection in recipient 
countries are associated with more bank capital inflows. On the other hand, we find that among the 
source countries with better information sharing, stronger creditor rights protection and property 
rights protection, there tends to be fewer bank capital outflows. Furthermore, we find better contract 
enforcement in the recipient country also helps attract more bank inflows. However, concentrated and 
state controlled local banking sector tends to deter the bank capitals from flowing into the recipient 
countries. In column (7) and (8), we find that growth opportunities at source countries discourage 
bank outflows while growth opportunities at recipient countries attract bank inflows.   
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We also perform three robustness tests. First, we consider various approaches for estimating the 
standard errors in our panel data.  Here we use the estimation approaches suggested by Petersen 
(2009) to test the robustness of the results to the clustering by two dimensions. As Petersen (2009) 
points out, in many cases, clustering by two dimensions help reduce biases in standard errors in panel 
studies. Specifically, we test the robustness to clustering by recipient country and time, clustering by 
source country and time, and clustering by recipient-source country pair and time and find the results 
highly consistent to our main findings. 
Second, we calculate for the key regulatory and institutional variables, the regulatory gaps 
between each source and recipient country, and use these as alternative explanatory variables. The 
results are very similar to those based on the gravity functions. Third, we examine the effects of 
regulatory changes on international bank flow changes. Focusing on changes allows us to account for 
unobservable time-invariant country specific characteristics that might influence both the level of 
bank regulation and international bank flows. This approach also helps alleviate the endogeneity 
concern (Lin et al., 2011). The details and the reported results for each of these tests can be found in 
the accompanying Internet Appendix (Table 3 and 4).  
 
3. 3. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
The above results demonstrate that cross-country bank flows are strongly associated with the 
regulatory and institutional environment of the source and recipient countries.  While we argue that 
these results are consistent with regulatory arbitrage, reverse causality remains a possibility – and 
rather than being exogenous, the regulatory and institutional environment in a given country may 
respond to changes in capital flows.  Certainly, these are common concerns that are often cited in the 
finance and growth literature.  As pointed out by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), it is very 
difficult to fully address this issue, but we have taken several steps to try to alleviate these concerns. 
First, we follow Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and use the measure of exogenous growth 
opportunities as an additional control to address the potential endogeneity issue. As Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad and Siegel (2007) point out, “Such a measure should prove useful in numerous empirical 
studies seeking to avoid endogeneity problems”. In addition, we use the fixed effect estimations to 
account for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics that may influence international bank 
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flows. To further ameliorate this concern, we provide a series of robustness tests using instrumental 
variable analysis and change regressions. In this sub-section, we will present and discuss the empirical 
results of instrumental variable analysis. We will discuss the change regression results in the 
subsequent sub-section. 
We first select the instrumental variables based on the theoretical and empirical work in the law, 
institution and finance literature (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2003, Easterly and Levine, 1997). The literature highlights the important roles of geographical 
endowment and ethnic fractionalization in shaping the political and financial institutions (Acemoglu 
et al., 2001, Beck et al., 2003, Easterly and Levine, 1997). Beck et al. (2003, 2006) and Barth et al. 
(2009) find strong evidence that geographical endowment and ethnic fractionalization exert 
substantial impacts on the formation of financial regulation and institutions. We therefore follow Beck 
et al. (2006) and use latitude and ethnic fractionalization as instrumental variables for the financial 
regulation measures. Following Beck et al. (2006), we also include the percentage of years that the 
country has been independent since 1776 as an additional IV because countries that gained their 
independence earlier had more chance to adopt regulations more valuable to economic development. 
 Moreover, the literature has documented the possibility of “regulation contagion”. As 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) point out, policymakers and regulators are influenced by the 
choices of policymakers in other countries. As the policy or regulation become more widespread, it 
becomes enshrined as fort of “universal best practice”, and countries are more likely to adopt it. 
Furthermore, regulators or policymakers may learn more about the workings of the regulation from 
those countries implementing the regulation. Therefore, regulators might modify their regulation after 
observing regulatory changes in other countries. We follow Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
and use the sample mean of the financial regulation measures at a specific year as additional 
instruments to capture the dynamic trend of regulatory changes.  
We also select the instrumental variables based on the supervisory structure and other 
macroeconomic characteristics. First, we create a dummy variable (central bank regulator) which 
equals one if the central bank is the bank regulator. As argued by Goodhart (2000), central banks care 
more about macro-economic monetary and price stability, which rests on the basis of maintaining the 
micro-level financial stability in the banking system. Therefore, central banks as the bank regulators 
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are more likely to adopt prudential regulations that will keep the systemic stability. We also use the 
average experiences of a professional bank supervisor as an additional control. The data is obtained 
from Barth et al., (2008). More experience bank supervisors are more likely to adopt the state-of-art 
bank regulations that help address various issues in the banking system. Moreover, we use the Gini 
coefficients as a measure of income inequality (past 5-year moving average) as an additional 
instrumental variable. As pointed out by Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010), “an influential political 
economy literature stresses that income distributional considerations, rather than efficiency 
considerations, frequently exert the dominant influence on bank regulation”.  As discussed above, 
these variables are likely to affect the bank regulations. At the same time, these variables per se are 
unlikely to exert a direct, first-order effect on the international bank flows. We therefore use them as 
additional instrumental variables in our analysis15. The empirical results are presented in Table 5. 
 [Table 5 here] 
 As can be seen from Table 5, the empirical results are rather robust. The coefficients of regulation 
and supervision variables in recipient countries remain positive and significant while the coefficients 
for these variables in source countries remain negative and significant. The results strongly confirm 
our finding that bank capital tends to flow from markets that are heavily regulated to those markets 
that are lightly regulated. Other controls also yield qualitatively similar results.  
Furthermore, the IV coefficients are somewhat larger than the OLS coefficients, indicating the 
existence of potential measurement error in the original results, which would tend to “attenuate” the 
coefficient estimate toward zero (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Barth et al., 2009).  Following the 
literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2006), we conduct two tests to assess the appropriateness of the instruments. 
First, we employ the overidentifying tests, which assess whether the instrumental variables are 
associated with the dependent variable beyond their effects through bank regulation and supervision 
or the other explanatory variables. We report the p-value of the test of the overidentifying restrictions. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies a failure to reject the validity of the instruments. As can be 
seen from Table 6, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid in all model 
                                                             
15 We also considered some other potential instrumental variables including a measure of press freedom. In a 
country with greater press freedom, people are more likely to get access to all sorts of information and express 
their voice. As a consequence, a country with greater press freedom is more likely to adopt state-of-art and 
appropriate regulation schemes. The empirical results are highly robust to the inclusion of this potential 
instrumental variable.  
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specifications, suggesting that these instruments only exert an impact on international bank flows 
through their effect on banking regulation and supervision. In addition, we conduct an F-test of the 
excluded exogenous variables in the first-stage regressions. We reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments do not explain cross-sectional differences in bank regulation and supervision at the 1% 
level in all model specifications. The p-values of the F-tests are reported in the last row of Table 6. 
Similar to the claim made in Beck et al. (2006), we are not arguing that these variables are the best 
instrumental variables. Instead, we hold that the instruments are reasonably exogenous and have 
decent explanatory power in explaining the bank regulation and supervision measures. 
 
3.4. Regulatory Arbitrage: Does Institutional Quality Matter? 
Despite the above results, there are countervailing reasons why bank capital would not 
necessarily flow to low regulated markets, particularly if these countries do not have strong 
institutional and legal environments.  Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in some circumstances 
strong regulations may actually signal quality and stability, and therefore help attract capital inflows. 
To further disentangle these effects and to better understand the economic context of regulatory 
arbitrage activities, we conduct a series of additional tests to explore whether the level of economic 
development and the legal and institutional environment influence the degree of regulatory arbitrage.  
We split the sample based on time period, economic development and institutional quality (i.e., 
creditor rights, information sharing and property rights) and conduct regression analysis for each 
sub-sample.   
A country with an equal or above median institutional quality score is viewed as a country with 
better institution. We then combine the above three individual institution quality indicators to obtain 
an aggregate measure of the overall institution quality for each country. For each individual indicator, 
we assign a value of one to a high quality country and zero to a low quality country. Then we sum the 
scores of each country across the three indicators to obtain the overall measure of institution quality of 
a country. The value of this aggregate measure goes from zero (lowest institution quality country) to 
three (highest institution quality country). If the aggregate measure of a country is equal or above the 
sample medium level, the country is defined as an overall high quality institution country. We then 
split the sample based on the overall institutional quality measure. The empirical results are presented 
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in Table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
  The first cut in columns (1) and (2) corresponds to the different time periods.   We find 
regulatory arbitrage patterns in both sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2007) though the effects are 
somewhat stronger in the latter period. In columns (3) and (4), we find regulatory gaps exert 
significant effects on bank flows to both developed countries and developing countries, however the 
effects on bank flows to developed countries are much more profound. Perhaps, not surprisingly, these 
results suggest that the incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage are much stronger within the set of 
developed countries.  The next set of tests explore whether the main results vary depending on the 
differences in the three measures of institutional quality (level of creditor rights, degree of information 
sharing and property rights protection).  In each case, countries with measures above the median 
level are characterized as having high institutional quality, while those below the median are 
characterized as having low quality.  Looking at these results in columns (5) to (10), we find strong 
evidence that cross-country differences in regulations have a much more profound effect on bank 
flows if the recipient country has stronger creditor rights, stronger property rights and a high degree of 
credit information sharing. Finally, we construct an overall measure of institutional quality by simply 
summing the three individual measures (varying from 0 to 3 – where a measure of 3 indicates that the 
country is above the median in terms of creditor rights protection, information sharing and property 
rights protection). Using the overall institutional quality index (columns 11 and 12), we find that the 
regulatory arbitrage effects are much stronger for the recipient countries with better institutional 
quality.  
 While we have focused on how the regulatory, institutional and legal environment influence bank 
flows, it is also worth considering whether these variable influence other aggregate key measures 
related to global finance.  For example, there is a large literature that looks at the determinants of the 
current account – and with this in mind, we consider separately how our key variables influence the 
current account.   
 Using the current account as a proxy for aggregate capital outflows, we find that overall activities 
restrictiveness, restriction on whether banks can own non-financial firms, capital regulation stringency, 
strength of external audit, financial statement transparency and independence of supervisory authority 
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are positively associated with aggregate capital outflows. Furthermore, we find that better institutional 
quality (i.e. stronger creditor rights, property rights, better contract enforcement and information 
sharing) are associated with lower degree of capital outflows.  Overall, the empirical results are 
highly consistent with our previous findings that used bank flows as the dependent variable.  The 
details of our estimating framework and the corresponding results are presented in the Internet 
Appendix Table 5.  
 
4. Empirical Results: Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Expansions 
 As discussed earlier, international banks may grow their foreign claims portfolio through two 
channels: (1) establishing affiliates in different countries and extend claims locally through their 
branches and subsidiaries in these countries, and (2) extending cross-border claims by financing and 
booking the claims from outside the recipient or host countries. Arguably, the regulatory arbitrage 
incentives have more of an effect on the first channel since the cross-border claims by the bank 
headquarter are often subject to the regulation in the source country. In this section, we try to provide 
more direct evidence about the regulatory arbitrage incentives and banks foreign expansion strategies 
that require a physical presence aboard (i.e. subsidiary or branch). We obtain bank level data including 
information on the bank foreign affiliates from Bankscope, which has comprehensive coverage in 
most countries, and accounts for over 90% of all banking assets in each country. Following the 
literature (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005), we compiled an original database on the operations of 
301 large banks (total assets> $25 billion USD) with headquarters in one of the 26 source countries 
covered in the BIS statistics, focusing on their foreign presence (i.e. branch or subsidiary) in 120 
countries (i.e. the recipient countries in the BIS statistics) around the world. Information on branches 
and foreign subsidiaries refers to year 200816. After dropping some missing observations, we obtain 
more than 35,000 paired bank-country observations. To get some sense about the relation between the 
presence of bank foreign affiliates and international bank flows, we check the country pairs where the 
bank inflows are most out of the ordinary17 and find that the percentage of country pairs that the 
                                                             
16 The information is available in Bankscope only over the most recent years. 
17 Specifically, we omit the eight pairs of bank supervision and regulation variables for both the source and 
recipient countries in equation 7 of Table 4 and run an additional regression with other controls. We then 
calculate the mean of the residuals for each source-recipient country pairs based on the regression results. We 
sort the residuals and focus on the country pairs with the top 5% of the largest positive residuals. 
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source country has banking affiliates in the recipient country is about 71%18. Moreover, there exist 
significant regulatory gaps in the majority of these country pairs. 
 The empirical analysis broadly examines whether banks with headquarters in heavily 
regulated countries are more likely to have a foreign subsidiary or branch in countries with fewer 
supervisory and regulatory restrictions.   To explore this issue, we estimate the following probit 
model: Pr⁡(𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅 ,𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 = 1) = 𝐼𝐼(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 ,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 , 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 ,  𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 ,  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 ,𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ,  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 , 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟) 
                                                                               (6) 
where )(⋅f  is the standard normal cumulative distribution (cdf) in the Probit model, which can be 
expressed as ∫
∞−
=Φ=
z
dvvzzf )()()( φ , where )(⋅φ is the standard normal density. 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅 ,𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 = 1 when the bank i of country s has foreign affiliates (subsidiaries or branches) in country r, 
and zero otherwise (Foreign Presence). Alternatively, we define 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅 ,𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 = 1 when the bank i of 
country s has foreign subsidiaries in country r, and zero otherwise (Foreign Subsidiary). The foreign 
subsidiaries are locally charted and independently capitalized so that it is clear that they only need to 
operate under the host country’s regulation. Therefore, it might be a cleaner setting to test for 
regulatory arbitrage incentives by focusing on the bank foreign subsidiaries. Following Focarelli and 
Pozzolo (2005), subsidiaries refer to locally incorporated banks with the presence of foreign 
ownership19. The empirical results are presented in Table 7. Columns (1) to (5) and (7) are estimated 
using Foreign Subsidiary as the dependent variables, while column (6) is based uses Foreign Presence 
as the dependent variable. In columns (7), we include growth opportunities and financial liberalization 
                                                             
18 For example, among these pairs, Portuguese banks have affiliates in Poland and Franc, and Japanese banks 
have affiliates in Italy, France and Philippines. Among these pairs, we also find that banks in Spain and 
Switzerland have affiliates in Germany, . Denmark banks have affiliates in U.K. and Lithuania, and U.S. banks 
have affiliates in Norway, Romania, Sweden and U.K .have affiliates in U.K. and Lithuania. U.S. banks have 
affiliates in Norway, Romania, Sweden and U.K.  
19 In principle, one would like to find a minimum percent of equity interest needed to ensure the effective 
control powers in determining the bank’s activities. 50% share might be too stringent because the effective 
control definitely depends on the distribution of ownership (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005). We therefore follow 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) and define foreign subsidiaries as all banks with a shareholder out of the country, 
without any participation threshold. We also test the robustness of the results using more stringent definition that 
a subsidiary refers to locally incorporated banks with the more than 50% foreign ownership. The empirical 
results are highly robust. 
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as additional control variables. 
[Table 7 here] 
 As can be seen from Table 7, the empirical results are highly consistent with our previous 
findings. Specifically, we find that banks in countries with more activities restrictions, stringent 
capital regulations, higher disclosure requirements, strong external audit, powerful and independent 
supervisor, and more stringent loan classification are more likely to expand abroad by establishing 
subsidiaries and/or branches. Regarding the host country’s characteristics, we find that international 
banks are more likely to set up subsidiaries or branches in countries with fewer activities restrictions, 
less restrictive capital regulations, lower disclosure requirements, weak external audit and supervisor, 
and lenient loan classifications. The empirical results are both statistically significant and 
economically significant. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in Activities Restrictions in 
the source country increases the likelihood of bank’s foreign expansion by about 6% (column 1) to 
10% (column 7). In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in Activities Restrictions in the host 
country decreases the likelihood of foreign bank’s presence by about 4% (column 1) to 8% (column 7). 
A one unit increase in Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms in the source country results in a 6% increase 
in the likelihood of bank’s foreign expansion; a one unit increase in Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms 
in the recipient country decreases the likelihood of foreign bank’s presence by 5%. Considering the 
sample mean (6%) of the foreign expansion tendency (Foreign Subsidiary Dummy), the effects are 
economically important.  
 The other aspects of regulation and supervision also yield significant results. For instance, a one 
standard deviation increase in Supervisory Power in the source country increases the likelihood of 
bank’s foreign expansion by about 10% (column 6); while a one standard deviation increase in 
Supervisory Power in the host country decreases the likelihood of foreign bank’s presence by about 
12% (column 6). Regarding the market monitoring, a one standard deviation increase in Strength of 
External Audit in the source country increases the likelihood of bank’s foreign expansion by about 7% 
(column 6); a one standard deviation increase in Strength of External Audit in the recipient country 
decrease the likelihood of foreign bank’s presence by 6%.  
Moreover, we find that larger banks with higher net income are more likely to expand abroad. 
Overall, the empirical results show that cross country regulatory differences play an important role in 
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the banks’ foreign expansion decisions.  
To understand the effects more intuitively, we also do a simple matching analysis. First, for each 
of the 26 source countries, we create dummy variable related to each of the eight supervision and 
regulation measures used in our previous analysis.  For each dummy variable, we assigned a value of 
1 to countries which have a more stringent regulation relative to the sample median. We then 
construct the overall regulation index as the sum of these eight dummy variables.  Thus, this overall 
measure ranges from 0 to 8 with a higher value indicating a higher level of bank regulation. We divide 
26 source countries into two groups of high/low regulation according to the overall regulation index 
of each country being above or below the medium level of the index.  
Next, we divide all 301 banks from the 26 source countries into big/small or high 
profitability/low profitability banks according to their size and net income relative to the respective 
medians. This gives us a total of four cells. For the four cells, we conduct four t-tests to see within 
each cell if banks located in highly regulated countries have more oversea subsidiaries than banks 
located in less regulated countries. In three out of the four cells (except small and low profitability 
banks), we find significant evidence that banks located in highly regulated countries tend to have 
more oversea subsidiaries than banks located in less regulated countries20. The results bolster the 
findings from our probit regression analysis. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there has been an ongoing discussion regarding 
the need to change the regulatory architecture of the global financial system. Many have stressed the 
need for more vigilant regulation, but a common concern is that financial institutions may be able to 
avoid regulations by shifting their business to less regulated markets.  This potential for regulatory 
arbitrage may therefore increase the benefits of coordinating regulations across financial markets.  
At the same time, there are benefits to allowing different regulations in different markets, which may 
limit the need for coordination if the risk of regulatory arbitrage is minimal.  
 With these issues in mind, this paper has explored in detail how differences in bank 
regulations have affected the flow of capital across markets over the past decade.  Our results 
                                                             
20 The results are presented in Table 6 in the Internet Appendix. 
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suggest that there are important “push and pull” effects where controlling for other factors, capital is 
more likely to flow from those markets with restrictive regulations to those markets that have fewer 
and more relaxed restrictions on bank capital and bank investment opportunities.  These results 
confirm that a form of regulatory arbitrage is taking place where banks tend to transfer funds to limit 
their regulatory tax.  In one respect, these results suggest that one way a developing country can 
attract foreign capital is by establishing fewer regulations.  In a positive sense, this form of 
cross-country competition may help put the brakes on any over- regulation of the global financial 
sector.  More negatively, these results lend support to the concerns raised by Acharya et. al. (2009) 
regarding a global “race to the bottom” where capital flows to the least regulated environment.  The 
concern is that in an interconnected global environment we all bear the risk associated with banking 
crises that arise due to insufficient regulation in any given market.  These concerns are particularly 
relevant in the context of the current financial crisis, and at the very least, our results reinforce the 
need for global coordination in banking regulations. 
At the same time, we hasten to add that our results do not necessarily suggest that there should be 
always be complete coordination in banking regulations.   Once can certainly argue that 
cross-country differences in regulations can often promote innovation.  Moreover, other differences 
in the economic, legal and institutional environment may make it such that one size doesn’t fit all 
when it comes to banking regulation.  More practically, real-world political considerations often 
limit regulators’ ability to coordinate effective regulations. 21 One possible solution is to start 
international coordination among large developed economies since the regulatory arbitrage activities 
tend to be more prevalent in these economies. In summary, while we think our results are instructive 
and highlight the concerns regarding regulatory arbitrage, when it comes to the details regarding the 
global coordination of banking regulations there is obviously a lot of room for future research.  
  
                                                             
21 See Lannoo (2009) for a good discussion of the challenges involved in coordinating regulations within the 
European Union in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.  
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Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Original Sources 
Bank flows 
This variable captures the bank capital inflows from banks located in source country s to all sectors of the economy in 
recipient country r from year t-1 to t. Specifically, it is defined as 100 times the log difference (i.e. difference in log 
from t-1 to t) of total foreign claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). The 
definition of foreign claims is defined by the nationality of the headquarter of the reporting bank published in the 
consolidated banking statistics Table 9B in each issue of the BIS Quarterly Review. 
Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS, 
2008a) 
Creditor rights 
An index aggregating creditor rights. Specifically, it measures (1) whether there are restrictions imposed, such as 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividend, when a debtor files for reorganization (Restrictions on Reorganization); (2) 
whether secured creditors are able to gain possession of assets after the petition for reorganization is approved, that is, 
whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court on creditor’s ability to seize collateral (No 
Automatic Stay); (3) whether secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers (Secured Creditor Paid First); and (4) whether the 
incumbent management does not stay in control of the firm during the reorganization (No Management Stay). The 
index ranges between 0 and 4 and is constructed on yearly base. 
La Porta et al. (1998), 
Djankov, et al (2007) 
Depth of credit 
information  
An index that measures the information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a 
country’s information agencies have each of these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, 
loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for example, late payments, number and 
amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; 
(3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 
years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and 
(6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values 
indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate 
lending decisions. If a country has no public registry or private bureau in a specific year, the index takes on the value 0. 
If an information agency exists in a country, the index takes on the value in that year or the value in the earliest 
available year. 
Djankov et al. (2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Top 5 bank concentration 
(all banks) The fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the country.  Bankscope 
Government bank 
ownership The fraction of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or more owned by government. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Overall activities 
restrictions 
The extent to which banks may engage in (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, and (c) real estate investment, development, and 
management. Unrestricted=1: full range of activities can be conducted directly in the bank; Permitted=2: full range of 
activates can be conducted, but some or all must be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted=3: less than full range of 
activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited=4: the activity cannot be conducted in either the 
bank or subsidiaries. Higher values indicate greater restrictiveness. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
34 
 
Restriction on banks own 
nonfinancial firms 
The extent to which banks may own and control nonfinancial firms (higher value means more restrictive). 
Unrestricted=1=a bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any nonfinancial firm; 
Permitted=2=a bank may own 100 percent of the equity of a nonfinancial firm, but ownership is limited based on a 
bank’s equity capital; 
Restricted=3=a bank can only acquire less than 100 percent of the equity in a nonfinancial firm; and 
Prohibited=4=a bank may not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm whatsoever. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Independence of 
supervisory authority - 
Overall 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the 
banking industry. The indicator is constructed based on the following three questions. 1. Are the supervisory bodies 
responsible or accountable to a) Prime Minister, b) the Finance Minister or other cabinet level official, c) a legislative 
body, such as parliament of congress (yes=1)?  2.  Are the supervisors legally liable for their actions (i.e. if a 
supervisor takes actions against a bank, the supervisor cannot be sued) (No=1)?  3. Does the head of the supervisory 
agency (and other directors) have a fixed term and how long? (=1 if the term>=4). Higher value means a more 
independent supervisory agency. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Official supervisory power  
Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1.Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with 
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors required by law to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in 
elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
4.Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 5. Are off-balance sheet 
items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to 
distribute: a) Dividends? b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that 
this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 9. Does the Banking Law give 
authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem bank? 
10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency 
or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace 
management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Loan classification 
leniency 
If there is a loan classification system, the actual minimum number of days beyond which a loan in arrears must be 
classified as substandard, then doubtful, and finally loss are summed. Higher values indicate less stringency. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Capital regulatory index 
(total) 
The sum of overall capital regulatory stringency and initial capital stringency, which measures whether certain funds 
may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are officially verified. Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
Strength of external audit 
The effectiveness of external audits of banks. It is an indicator developed based on the following 
questions (Yes=1, No=0) : 1. Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 2. Are specific requirements for 
the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? 3. Are auditors licensed or certified? 4. Do supervisors get a copy of the 
auditor's report? 5. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report 
without the approval of the bank? 6. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
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any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 7. Can 
supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Higher values indicate better strength of external 
audit. 
Financial statement 
transparency 
It includes the information on whether accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement; whether 
financial institutions are required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial 
subsidiaries; whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; whether banks are required to disclose their 
risk management procedures to the public; and whether bank directors are legally liable if information disclosed is 
erroneous or misleading. The index ranges from 0 to 6 with higher values indicating better financial statement 
transparency. 
Barth et al. (2006, 
2008) 
No. of days to enforce 
contracts    
Number of calendar days counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes 
both the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between. The respondents make separate estimates of 
the average duration of different stages of dispute resolution: the completion of service of process (time to file the 
case), the issuance of judgment (time for the trial and obtaining the judgment) and the moment of payment (time for 
enforcement). 
Djankov et al. (2003), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Property rights Countries with more secure property rights and legal institutions that were more supportive of rule of law received higher ratings. 
Fraser Institute Website 
(2008) 
Log income  Log real GDP per capita, in UD dollars. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log population  Log population (millions) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Common language Dummy variable that equals one if the two countries share a common language Rose (2004) 
Log distance Log geographic distance 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Financial liberalization 
index 
An index of financial liberalization over the period of 1973-2005 for 91 economies. Codes were assigned along the 
seven dimensions below. Each dimension has various sub-dimensions. Based on the score for each sub-dimension, 
each dimension receives a ‘‘raw score.’’ The explanations for each sub-dimension below indicate how to assign the raw 
score. After a raw score is assigned, it is normalized to a 0–3 scale. The normalization is done on the basis of the 
classifications listed below for each dimension. That is, fully liberalized=3; partially liberalized=2; partially 
repressed=1; fully repressed=0. The index contains various dimensions including credit controls and reserve 
requirements, interest rate liberalization, entry barriers, capital account restrictions, privatization, and securities market 
policies and supervision. 
Abiad, et al. (2010) 
Growth opportunity 
An implied measure of country-specific growth opportunities that reflects the growth prospects for each industry (at 
the global level) weighted by the industrial composition for each country. An annual measure is constructed as the 
3-digit SIC industry composition for each country by their output shares according to UNIDO Industrial Statistics 
Bekaert, et al. (2007), 
Datastream, and 
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Database. For each SIC code, the price-earnings (PE) ratios for that industry at the global level is used to construct an 
implied measure of growth opportunities for each country by weighting each global industry PE ratio by its relative 
share for that country. This measure then is subtracted by the overall world market PE ratio to remove the world 
discount rate effect (and also is subtractby a 5-year moving average), and call the difference ‘‘growth opportunities’’ 
(LGO_MA). That is, LGO_MAi,t =  LGOi,t - Σs=1 to 5 LGOi,t-s , where LGOi,t = ln[(IPEt Wi,t)/(IPEt Wt)], IPEt is a 
vector of global industry price-earning ratios, Wi,t is a vector of country-specific industry weights, and Wt is a vector 
of the world industry weights. 
UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics Database 
 
Current account /GNP (%) The current account divided by GNP (%)  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Saving /GNP (%) The gross saving of both the public and private sectors divided by GNP (%) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Foreign subsidiary dummy A dummy that takes the value of one if the bank with headquarter in country s has a foreign subsidiary in country r, and is zero otherwise, in 2008. Bankscope 
Foreign branch/subsidiary 
dummy 
A dummy that takes the value of one if the bank with headquarter in country s has either a foreign subsidiary or a 
foreign branch in country r, and is zero otherwise, in 2008. Bankscope 
Bank size Log of bank total assets (thousands of USD), 3-year average over 2005-2007. Bankscope 
Bank net income Bank’s net income divided by total assets (%), 3-year average over 2005-2007. Bankscope 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
No. of 
countries 
Panel A: Bilateral relation variables 
 
 
     
Bank flows 2.89  2.03 11.32  -99.97  99.98 24,233 120 
Common language 0.14 0 0.35  0 1 2,065 120 
Log distance 8.03 8.33 0.92  4.80  9.90 2,065 120 
Panel B: Country level variables 
 
 
     
Creditor rights  1.81  2 1.13  0 4 1368 120 
Depth of credit information 3.06  3 2.21  0 6 
 
120 
Top 5 bank concentration 0.80  0.83 0.18  0.19  1 1368 120 
Government bank ownership 0.20  0.12 0.24  0 0.94  1272 113 
No. of days to enforce contracts (log) 6.39 6.24 5.65 4.79 7.29 1368 120 
Property rights 5.37  5.30 1.77  1.43  9.62  1368 120 
Log income  7.50  7.43 1.59  4.41  10.63  1368 120 
Log population  2.66  2.39 1.35  0.47  7.19  1368 120 
Financial liberalization index 15.31 15.25 3.73 3.75 21.00 792 86 
Growth opportunity 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.33 0.33 1059 92 
Current account /GNP (%) -2.28 -2.65 8.20 -44.73 55.53 1,202 104 
Saving /GNP (%) 19.72 18.83 9.07 0.41 58.36 1,202 104 
Panel C: Regulatory variables  
 
 
     
Overall activities restrictions  7.64 8 2.03 3 12 1272 113 
Restriction on banks own nonfinancial firms  2.57 3 0.79 1 4 1272 113 
Capital regulatory index (total) 6.00 6 1.78 1 10 1260 111 
Independence of supervisory authority - overall 1.70 2 0.89 0 3 1236 109 
Official Supervisory Power 11.16 11 2.44 4 16 1296 114 
Loan classification leniency (log) 7.18 6.70 1.29 3.40 9.30 1296 114 
Strength of external audit  5.19 6 1.19 2 7 1272 113 
Financial statement transparency  4.01 5 0.97 1 6 1224 108 
Panel D: Cross-section data for banks’ foreign 
affiliates  
 
    
No. of 
banks 
Bank level variables 
 
 
     
Foreign subsidiary dummy 0.06  0 0.22  0 1 35,819 301 
Foreign branch/subsidiary dummy 0.07  0 0.23  0 1 35,819 301 
Bank size 18.67  18.44 1.27  17.04  21.62  35,819 301 
Bank net income 0.91  0.76 0.93  -0.487  8.90  35,819 301 
Note: For Panel A, B, and C, the sample period is 1996-2007. For Panel D, the sample is for 2007/8. 
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Table 3A. Regulatory arbitrage and aggregate bank inflows 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 
Overall activities restrictions (recipient) 
 
-0.29 
   
-0.39  -0.55 -0.71 
  
[0.015]** 
   
[0.035]**  [0.021]** [0.014]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(recipient) 
 
-0.86 
   
-0.88 
 
-1.26 -1.70 
  
[0.029]** 
   
[0.171]  [0.281] [0.216] 
capital regulatory index (recipient) 
  
-0.20 
  
-0.27  -0.31 -0.38 
   
[0.086]* 
  
[0.020]**  [0.073]* [0.058]* 
strength of external audit (recipient) 
   
-0.83 
 
-1.48  -1.81 -2.32 
    
[0.054]* 
 
[0.033]**  [0.014]** [0.009]*** 
fin statement transparency (recipient) 
   
-1.27 
 
-0.95  -1.63 -1.98 
    
[0.025]** 
 
[0.073]*  [0.057]* [0.045]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority 
(recipient) 
    
-1.25 -1.33 
 
-1.10 -0.85 
     
[0.035]** [0.032]**  [0.029]** [0.032]** 
Official Supervisory Power (recipient) 
    
-0.24 -0.23  -0.36 -0.47 
     
[0.184] [0.074]*  [0.025]** [0.020]** 
Loan classification leniency (recipient) 
     
0.69  0.59 0.51 
      
[0.022]**  [0.016]** [0.012]** 
Creditor rights (recipient) 5.83 6.11 6.22 5.96 5.98 6.93  7.03 7.89 
 
[0.063]* [0.033]** [0.032]** [0.073]* [0.034]** [0.027]**  [0.032]** [0.025]** 
Info sharing (recipient) 2.42 2.30 2.45 2.19 2.20 2.16  2.72 1.58 
 
[0.028]** [0.081]* [0.026]** [0.091]* [0.032]** [0.085]*  [0.067]* [0.088]* 
No. of days to enforce contracts 
(recipient) 
     
-0.11 
 
-0.12 -0.10 
      
[0.026]**  [0.038]** [0.044]** 
Property rights (recipient) 3.54 3.66 3.76 3.31 3.39 3.66  2.34 2.81 
 
[0.014]** [0.027]** [0.022]** [0.052]* [0.064]* [0.033]**  [0.028]** [0.021]** 
Log income (recipient) 2.92 3.10 2.77 3.15 3.10 2.35  3.90 4.77 
 
[0.082]* [0.018]** [0.063]* [0.012]** [0.024]** [0.089]*  [0.075]* [0.056]* 
Log population (recipient) 2.23 3.01 2.35 2.38 3.13 3.40  3.66 4.52 
 
[0.303] [0.256] [0.239] [0.277] [0.239] [0.043]**  [0.047]** [0.036]** 
Fin liberalization (recipient) 
      
 0.81 0.97 
       
 [0.039]** [0.034]** 
Growth opportunity  (recipient) 
      
 1.76 2.06 
       
 [0.017]** [0.016]** 
Sample period 1996-2007     1996-2005 
Recipient country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 1,372 1,264 1,264 1,228 1,240 1,168  642 642 
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18  0.38 0.43 
No. of recipient countries 120 111 111 108 109 103  71 71 
Note: The dependent variable is aggregate bank inflows to 120 recipient countries, which is defined as 100 
times the log-difference of total foreign claims (FCr) of 26 source countries to recipient country r, that is, 
100*∆ln(ΣsFCsr). The estimation is based on fixed effect OLS regressions. For column 8, it is based on GDP 
(in US $)-weighted OLS estimation. The country level banking regulatory variables are time varying and are 
based on three major surveys spanning almost over a decade by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2008). The values of regulatory variables for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first survey recorded 
in 1998/1999. Their values for the period of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the second survey that assesses the 
state of regulation as of the end of 2002. Their values for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third 
survey that was sought a characterization of the environment as of the end of 2005. Detailed variable definitions 
can be found in Table 1. Time fixed effects and recipient country specific effects are included in the regressions 
but not reported. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient 
countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table 3B. Regulatory arbitrage and aggregate bank outflows 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 
Overall activities restrictions (source) 
 
0.53 
   
0.92  1.06 1.16 
  
[0.025]** 
   
[0.024]**  [0.017]** [0.012]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(source) 
 
2.33 
   
2.28 
 
2.19 1.50 
  
[0.087]* 
   
[0.017]**  [0.014]** [0.017]** 
capital regulatory index (source) 
  
0.28 
  
0.41  0.65 0.78 
   
[0.038]** 
  
[0.097]*  [0.076]* [0.057]* 
strength of external audit (source) 
   
0.85 
 
0.74  1.27 1.72 
    
[0.032]** 
 
[0.218]  [0.139] [0.113] 
fin statement transparency (source) 
   
2.62 
 
2.74  2.45 2.91 
    
[0.026]** 
 
[0.030]**  [0.026]** [0.021]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority 
(source) 
    
1.05 1.41 
 
1.89 1.26 
     
[0.083]* [0.542]  [0.389] [0.446] 
Official Supervisory Power (source) 
    
1.83 1.76  1.28 0.78 
     
[0.131] [0.041]**  [0.037]** [0.059]* 
Loan classification leniency (source) 
     
-0.44  -0.32 -0.25 
      
[0.013]**  [0.018]** [0.025]** 
Creditor rights (source) -3.24 -3.86 -3.31 -2.95 -2.90 -2.89  -2.77 -3.09 
 
[0.016]** [0.022]** [0.052]* [0.141] [0.113] [0.024]**  [0.034]** [0.026]** 
Info sharing (source) -1.55 -1.18 -1.56 -1.08 -0.84 -0.76  -0.97 -0.70 
 
[0.028]** [0.030]** [0.028]** [0.030]** [0.173] [0.003]***  [0.015]** [0.0061]*** 
No. of days to enforce contracts (source) 
     
0.21  0.19 0.22 
      
[0.014]**  [0.017]** [0.016]** 
Property rights (source) -4.61 -4.26 -4.62 -4.36 -5.70 -4.79  -5.17 -6.51 
 
[0.035]** [0.063]* [0.058]* [0.062]* [0.037]** [0.035]**  [0.024]** [0.018]** 
Log income (source) -1.02 -1.70 -1.56 -1.65 -1.74 -1.31  -1.82 -2.09 
 
[0.333] [0.032]** [0.330] [0.281] [0.036]** [0.277]  [0.145] [0.108] 
Log population (source) -2.01 -2.68 -2.13 -1.85 -2.53 -2.73  -2.98 -1.71 
 
[0.122] [0.031]** [0.120] [0.124] [0.081]* [0.146]  [0.123] [0.149] 
Fin liberalization (source) 
      
 0.42 0.34 
       
 [0.176] [0.228] 
Growth opportunity (source) 
      
 -1.49 -1.26 
  
      
 [0.025]** [0.030]** 
Sample period 1996-2007     1996-2005 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238  181 181 
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.36  0.37 0.41 
No. of source countries 26 26 26 26 26 26  23 23 
Note: The dependent variable is aggregate bank outflows from 26 source countries, which is defined as 100 
times the log-difference of total foreign claims (FCs) of source country s to 120 recipient countries, that is, 
100*∆ln(ΣrFCsr). The estimation is based on fixed effect OLS regressions. For column 8, it is based on GDP 
(in US $)-weighted OLS estimation. The country level banking regulatory variables are time varying and are 
based on three major surveys spanning almost over a decade by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2008). The values of regulatory variables for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first survey recorded 
in 1998/1999. Their values for the period of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the second survey that assesses the 
state of regulation as of the end of 2002. Their values for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third 
survey that was sought a characterization of the environment as of the end of 2005. Detailed variable definitions 
can be found in Table 1. Time fixed effects and source country specific effects are included in the regressions 
but not reported. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for source 
countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table 4. Regulatory arbitrage and bank flows 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Overall activities restrictions 
(source)  0.39    0.30 0.36 0.29 
  [0.014]**    [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** 
Overall activities restrictions 
(recipient)  -0.25    -0.32 -0.33 -0.27 
  [0.013]**    [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.014]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin 
firms (source)  1.30    1.56 1.52 1.22 
  [0.071]*    [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.022]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin 
firms (recipient)  -1.97    -1.41 -1.42 -1.75 
  [0.014]**    [0.149] [0.143] [0.116] 
capital regulatory index (source)   0.59   0.25 0.23 0.18 
   [0.027]**   [0.081]* [0.078]* [0.103] 
capital regulatory index 
(recipient)   -0.43   -0.35 -0.34 -0.25 
   [0.072]*   [0.033]** [0.026]** [0.031]** 
strength of external audit (source)    0.72  0.52 0.70 0.61 
    [0.028]**  [0.158] [0.153] [0.169] 
strength of external audit 
(recipient)    -0.26  -0.47 -0.65 -0.53 
    [0.058]*  [0.030]** [0.021]** [0.029]** 
fin statement transparency 
(source)    1.60  1.28 1.85 1.40 
    [0.035]**  [0.027]** [0.020]** [0.026]** 
fin statement transparency 
(recipient)    -0.96  -0.59 -0.56 -0.75 
    [0.022]**  [0.064]* [0.062]* [0.036]** 
Independence of Supervisory 
Authority (source)     0.94 1.29 1.05 0.87 
     [0.060]* [0.140] [0.199] [0.254] 
Independence of Supervisory 
Authority (recipient)     -0.71 -0.55 -0.83 -0.68 
     [0.040]** [0.040]** [0.030]** [0.034]** 
Official Supervisory Power 
(source)     0.46 0.61 0.66 0.57 
     [0.036]** [0.056]* [0.052]* [0.070]* 
Official Supervisory Power 
(recipient)     -0.39 -0.35 -0.52 -0.65 
     [0.065]* [0.031]** [0.021]** [0.016]** 
Loan classification leniency 
(source)      -0.26 -0.27 -0.22 
      [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Loan classification leniency 
(recipient)      0.43 0.41 0.33 
      [0.037]** [0.033]** [0.039]** 
Creditor rights (source) -3.68 -3.74 -3.03 -2.74 -3.31 -2.68 -2.40 -1.83 
 [0.019]** [0.014]** [0.016]** [0.059]* [0.096]* [0.026]** [0.024]** [0.034]** 
Creditor rights (recipient) 4.69 4.56 3.94 4.18 4.59 3.39 3.65 2.94 
 [0.018]** [0.020]** [0.070]* [0.036]** [0.048]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.024]** 
Info sharing (source) -0.66 -0.67 -0.39 -0.74 -0.72 -0.46 -0.68 -0.55 
 [0.011]** [0.018]** [0.061]* [0.008]*** [0.011]** [0.045]** [0.040]** [0.063]* 
Info sharing (recipient) 0.85 1.11 1.01 1.15 0.93 1.12 1.17 1.26 
 [0.074]* [0.021]** [0.027]** [0.020]** [0.063]* [0.062]* [0.062]* [0.034]** 
No. of days to enforce contracts 
(recipient)      0.08 0.10 0.08 
      [0.030]** [0.040]** [0.057]* 
No. of days to enforce contracts 
(source)      -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 
      [0.014]** [0.020]** [0.024]** 
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Top 5 bank concentration 
(recipient)      -2.60 -3.64 -2.96 
      [0.092]* [0.062]* [0.075]* 
Government bank ownership 
(recipient)      -1.09 -1.67 -1.37 
      [0.035]** [0.030]** [0.038]** 
Property rights (source) -2.34 -2.52 -2.55 -3.22 -2.29 -1.98 -2.44 -2.07 
 [0.035]** [0.068]* [0.063]* [0.024]** [0.114] [0.035]** [0.031]** [0.042]** 
Property rights (recipient) 1.68 1.91 1.96 1.95 2.22 2.50 1.86 1.65 
 [0.031]** [0.103] [0.040]** [0.108] [0.067]* [0.021]** [0.030]** [0.037]** 
Log income (source) -1.54 -1.09 -1.07 -1.72 -0.98 -1.27 -1.16 -0.93 
 [0.017]** [0.216] [0.170] [0.045]** [0.261] [0.252] [0.219] [0.294] 
Log income (recipient) 2.63 1.88 1.82 1.82 1.21 2.09 2.11 1.50 
 [0.050]* [0.027]** [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.079]* [0.051]* [0.071]* [0.091]* 
Log population (source) 3.75 2.80 2.20 2.48 2.16 1.34 1.60 1.29 
 [0.039]** [0.064]* [0.269] [0.041]** [0.108] [0.155] [0.193] [0.240] 
Log population (recipient) 2.01 1.67 1.79 1.42 1.35 2.83 2.48 2.03 
 [0.481] [0.104] [0.220] [0.318] [0.170] [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.040]** 
Common language 2.51 3.94 3.99 4.05 4.06 4.05 5.40 4.30 
 [0.061]* [0.068]* [0.079]* [0.179] [0.039]** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Log distance -1.56 -1.48 -1.85 -1.71 -1.66 -1.64 -1.38 -1.74 
 [0.072]* [0.122] [0.017]** [0.111] [0.012]** [0.184] [0.263] [0.258] 
Fin liberalization (source)       0.37 0.29 
       [0.162] [0.221] 
Fin liberalization (recipient)       0.52 0.42 
       [0.011]** [0.013]** 
Growth opportunity (source)       -1.22 -1.41 
       [0.027]** [0.037]** 
Growth opportunity  (recipient)       1.67 1.16 
       [0.029]** [0.035]** 
Sample period 1996-2007 1996-2005 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Recipient country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 14,430 13,738 13,790 13,467 13,601 12,936 7,923 7,923 
No. of source countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 23 23 
No. of recipient countries 120 111 111 108 109 102 70 70 
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 - 
Note: The dependent variable is bank flows, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of total foreign 
claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). P-values are presented in 
brackets. The estimations are based on fixed effect OLS regressions for columns 1 to 7 and GMM for column 8. 
P-values for columns 1 to 7 are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient 
countries. The GMM estimator and its corresponding p-values of coefficients are based on weighting matrix II 
of Bekaert et al. (2001, p.477), which is an extended panel-data version of Newey and West (1987) robust 
covariance matrix that facilitates serial correlation, cross-country heteroskedasticity, and restricted SUR effects 
(i.e., the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrices are restricted to be identical). The lag length 
of the GMM estimator is chosen as 3 due to our limited 10-year sample period (Greene, 2008, p.643). The 
country level banking regulatory variables are time varying and are based on three major surveys spanning 
almost over a decade by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). The values of regulatory variables 
for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first survey recorded in 1998/1999. Their values for the period 
of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of the end of 2002. 
Their values for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third survey that was sought a characterization of 
the environment as of the end of 2005. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table 1. Time fixed effects, 
as well as source and recipient country specific effects are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5 Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall activities restrictions (source) 0.86 
   
0.60 0.53 
 
[0.003]*** 
   
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Overall activities restrictions (recipient) -0.43 
   
-0.57 -0.46 
 
[0.013]** 
   
[0.016]** [0.015]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms (source) 2.55 
   
2.50 2.73 
 
[0.069]* 
   
[0.020]** [0.015]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(recipient) -2.82 
   
-2.66 -2.08 
 
[0.012]** 
   
[0.126] [0.114] 
capital regulatory index (source) 
 
0.87 
  
0.43 0.46 
  
[0.027]** 
  
[0.092]* [0.077]* 
capital regulatory index (recipient) 
 
-0.83 
  
-0.73 -0.98 
  
[0.059]* 
  
[0.034]** [0.018]** 
strength of external audit (source) 
  
1.40 
 
0.73 1.18 
   
[0.024]** 
 
[0.484] [0.241] 
strength of external audit (recipient) 
  
-0.57 
 
-0.94 -1.20 
   
[0.062]* 
 
[0.020]** [0.009]*** 
fin statement transparency (source) 
  
3.09 
 
2.60 3.66 
   
[0.031]** 
 
[0.004]*** [0.012]* 
fin statement transparency (recipient) 
  
-1.66 
 
-1.09 -1.17 
   
[0.028]** 
 
[0.021]** [0.059]* 
Independence of Supervisory Authority (source) 
   
1.66 2.23 1.48 
    
[0.053]* [0.047]** [0.302] 
Independence of Supervisory Authority 
(recipient) 
   
-1.16 -0.87 -1.33 
    
[0.041]** [0.041]** [0.025]** 
Official Supervisory Power (source) 
   
0.87 1.31 0.95 
    
[0.038]** [0.032]** [0.036]** 
Official Supervisory Power (recipient) 
   
-0.67 -0.94 -1.06 
    
[0.060]* [0.029]** [0.023]** 
Loan classification leniency (source) 
    
-0.45 -0.38 
     
[0.000]*** [0.015]** 
Loan classification leniency (recipient) 
    
0.66 0.56 
     
[0.014]** [0.027]** 
Creditor rights (source) -4.86 -3.58 -2.81 -3.16 -2.44 -3.62 
 
[0.007]*** [0.016]** [0.055]* [0.102] [0.020]** [0.014]** 
Creditor rights (recipient) 4.56 3.86 4.16 4.54 3.22 3.61 
 
[0.020]** [0.069]* [0.034]** [0.044]** [0.014]** [0.017]** 
Info sharing (source) -0.70 -0.39 -0.74 -0.67 -0.47 -0.06 
 
[0.015]** [0.060]* [0.008]*** [0.015]** [0.045]** [0.059]* 
Info sharing (recipient) 1.12 1.00 1.15 0.94 1.23 1.42 
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[0.021]** [0.027]** [0.018]** [0.061]* [0.046]** [0.045]** 
Property rights (source) -2.87 -2.56 -3.25 -2.47 -1.73 -2.44 
 
[0.054]* [0.061]* [0.022]** [0.125] [0.029]** [0.039]** 
Property rights (recipient) 1.89 1.95 1.94 2.23 2.32 1.87 
 
[0.105] [0.039]** [0.106] [0.063]* [0.022]** [0.031]** 
Sample period 1996-2007 1996-2005 
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Recipient country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
1st-stage F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan’s over-identification test (p-value) 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.19 
Observations 13,738 13,790 13,467 13,601 12,936 7,923 
No. of recipient countries 26 26 26 26 26 23 
No. of source countries 111 111 108 109 102 70 
Adj. R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 
Note: The dependent variable is bank flows, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of the ratio of total 
foreign claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). The estimation is 
based on IV regressions. 1st-stage F-test is the test of excluded instrument in the first-stage regression. For 
Sargan’s over-identification test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the 
residuals. Instrumental variables include the experience of banking supervisors, a dummy for central bank as 
supervisor, Gini coefficients as a measure of income inequality (past 5-year moving average), percentage of 
years since 1776 that a country has been independent, ethnic fractionalization, latitude, the average regulatory 
level of other countries in the sample in a specific year. Other control variables include log income (source and 
recipient), log population (source and recipient), common language and log distance. In column 6, other control 
variables also include financial liberalization (source and recipient) and growth opportunity (source and 
recipient). Time fixed effects, as well as source and recipient country specific effects are included in the 
regressions but not reported. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table 1. P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 6. Split sample estimation: Regulation arbitrage activities over time and across quality of institutions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Split sample over time 
Bank flow 
from adv. 
to adv. 
economies 
Bank flow 
from adv. to 
emerging/dev. 
economies 
Bank flow 
to high 
creditor 
rights 
economies 
Bank flow 
to low 
creditor 
rights 
economies 
Bank flow 
to high 
infoshare 
economies 
Bank flow 
to low 
infoshare 
economies 
Bank flow 
to high 
property 
rights 
economies 
Bank flow 
to low 
property 
rights 
economies 
Bank flow 
to high 
quality 
institution 
economies 
Bank flow 
to low 
quality 
institution 
economies 
Sample period 1996-2001 2002-2007 1996-2007 
Overall activities 
restrictions (gap) 0.61 0.70 1.13 0.27 1.03 0.61 0.76 0.25 2.12 0.15 1.31 0.12 
 
[0.029]** [0.018]** [0.008]*** [0.052]* [0.005]*** [0.249] [0.025]** [0.037]** [0.000]*** [0.262] [0.000]*** [0.140] 
Restriction on banks own 
nonfin firms (gap) 1.41 1.48 1.91 0.96 1.83 0.43 0.54 0.43 1.63 0.62 1.93 0.92 
 
[0.031]** [0.024]** [0.012]** [0.039]** [0.019]** [0.069]* [0.027]** [0.038]** [0.024]** [0.031]** [0.004]*** [0.018]** 
capital regulatory index 
(gap) 0.38 0.56 0.32 0.28 0.50 0.14 0.61 0.34 0.67 0.12 0.38 0.21 
 
[0.031]** [0.011]** [0.034]** [0.039]** [0.012]** [0.035]** [0.023]** [0.088]* [0.002]*** [0.031]** [0.009]*** [0.034]** 
strength of external audit 
(gap) 0.93 1.73 2.06 0.12 1.24 0.32 1.54 0.63 2.05 0.23 1.62 0.22 
 
[0.084]* [0.021]** [0.008]*** [0.216] [0.029]** [0.236] [0.020]** [0.298] [0.002]*** [0.222] [0.014]** [0.232] 
fin statement 
transparency (gap) 1.39 1.77 0.69 0.27 0.49 0.40 0.71 0.61 0.24 0.11 0.43 0.32 
 
[0.033]** [0.006]*** [0.025]** [0.039]** [0.033]** [0.042]** [0.030]** [0.040]** [0.029]** [0.081]* [0.029]** [0.034]** 
Independence of 
Supervisory Authority - 
Overall (gap) 0.77 1.33 0.86 0.44 0.54 0.35 0.65 0.25 1.92 1.40 0.54 0.23 
 
[0.036]** [0.028]** [0.037]** [0.066]* [0.027]** [0.031]** [0.038]** [0.061]* [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.026]** [0.056]* 
Official Supervisory 
Power (gap) 0.18 1.28 0.39 0.30 0.23 0.15 0.39 0.12 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.14 
 
[0.163] [0.001]*** [0.014]** [0.041]** [0.035]** [0.071]* [0.026]** [0.073]* [0.028]** [0.051]* [0.012]** [0.077]* 
Loan classification 
leniency (gap) -0.63 -1.26 -2.19 -0.93 -0.23 -0.21 -1.62 -0.64 -0.60 -0.58 -1.34 -0.92 
 
[0.059]* [0.035]** [0.006]*** [0.028]** [0.028]** [0.083]* [0.020]** [0.045]** [0.034]** [0.058]* [0.019]** [0.022]** 
Creditor rights (gap) -2.99 -3.93 -2.10 -2.49 -0.33 -2.23 -0.52 -3.64 -0.87 -3.45 -0.13 -5.07 
 
[0.029]** [0.014]** [0.037]** [0.036]** [0.089]* [0.034]** [0.072]* [0.026]** [0.152] [0.024]** [0.192] [0.012]** 
Info share (gap) -0.94 -1.49 -0.85 -1.87 -0.54 -1.24 -1.01 -1.24 -0.13 -2.90 -0.52 -1.75 
 
[0.052]* [0.026]** [0.073]* [0.003]*** [0.097]* [0.013]** [0.038]** [0.018]** [0.090]* [0.000]*** [0.086]* [0.002]*** 
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Property rights (gap) -2.26 -2.46 -1.91 -2.25 -0.39 -0.86 -0.67 -1.29 -2.01 -2.87 -1.44 -1.62 
 
[0.017]** [0.176] [0.012]** [0.007]*** [0.075]* [0.052]* [0.128] [0.040]** [0.014]** [0.000]*** [0.027]** [0.004]*** 
Other Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Source country fixed 
effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Recipient country fixed 
effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,446 7,640 4,150 8,398 7,837 5,249 6,652 6,434 6,675 6,411 6,828 6,258 
No. of source countries 19 26 21 19 26 26 26 24 26 24 26 25 
No. of recipient countries 103 103 29 74 63 47 45 58 45 58 47 58 
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is bank flows, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of the total foreign claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, 
that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). The estimation is based on fixed effect OLS regressions. The country level banking regulatory variables are time varying and are based on three 
major surveys spanning almost over a decade by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). The values of regulatory variables for the period of 1996 to 1999 are 
taken from the first survey recorded in 1998/1999. Their values for the period of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of the 
end of 2002. Their values for the period of 2004 to 2007 are taken from the third survey that was sought a characterization of the environment as of the end of 2005. 
Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table 1. Other control variables include log income (gap), log population (gap), common language, log distance. Time fixed 
effects, as well as source and recipient country specific effects are included in the regressions but not reported. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. To 
define the high/low quality institution recipient countries in terms of the three indicators of creditor rights, depth of information sharing (infoshare), and property rights, we 
first calculate the average institution quality of each indicator for each country over time. If the average institution quality of an indicator for a country is equal or above the 
sample medium level, the country is defined as a high quality institution country for this particular indicator. The remaining countries are defined as low quality institution 
countries for this indicator. Next we combine the above three individual institution quality indicators to obtain an aggregate measure of the overall institution quality for 
each country. For each individual indicator, we assign a value of one to a high quality country and zero to a low quality country. Then we sum the scores of each country 
across the three indicators to obtain the overall measure of institution quality of a country. The value of this aggregate measure goes from zero (lowest institution quality 
country) to three (highest institution quality country). If the aggregate measure of a country is equal or above the sample medium level, the country is defined as an overall 
high quality institution country. The remaining countries are defined as low quality institution countries.
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Table 7. Probit estimation: Bank’s foreign affiliates and regulatory arbitrage 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Overall activities restrictions (source) 0.029    0.028 0.030 0.043 
 [0.067]*    [0.031]** [0.012]** [0.023]** 
Overall activities restrictions (recipient) -0.018    -0.012 -0.014 -0.042 
 [0.027]**    [0.019]** [0.023]** [0.014]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(source) 0.063    0.064 0.065 0.069 
 [0.024]**    [0.037]** [0.074]* [0.031]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(recipient) -0.049    -0.041 -0.036 -0.049 
 [0.029]**    [0.020]** [0.017]** [0.028]** 
Capital regulatory index (source)  0.027   0.027 0.021 0.049 
  [0.018]**   [0.015]** [0.021]** [0.026]** 
Capital regulatory index (recipient)  -0.011   -0.012 -0.014 -0.027 
  [0.014]**   [0.016]** [0.029]** [0.012]** 
Strength of external audit (source)   0.040  0.044 0.053 0.056 
   [0.032]**  [0.038]** [0.079] * [0.013]** 
Strength of external audit (recipient)   -0.032  -0.031 -0.047 -0.048 
   [0.128]  [0.025]** [0.031]** [0.026]** 
Fin statement transparency (source)   0.035  0.033 0.030 0.020 
   [0.011]**  [0.030]** [0.029]** [0.015]** 
Fin statement transparency (recipient)   -0.018  -0.024 -0.016 -0.032 
   [0.019]**  [0.024]** [0.019]** [0.028]** 
Independence of supervisory authority 
(source)    0.057 0.046 0.051 0.049 
    [0.017]** [0.012]** [0.033]** [0.009]*** 
Independence of supervisory authority 
(recipient)    -0.023 -0.025 -0.027 -0.029 
    [0.015]** [0.031]** [0.029]** [0.023]** 
Official supervisory power (source)    0.036 0.037 0.038 0.039 
    [0.011]** [0.019]** [0.053]* [0.011]** 
Official supervisory power (recipient)    -0.028 -0.025 -0.020 -0.049 
    [0.051]* [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.031]** 
Loan classification leniency (source)     -0.044 -0.041 -0.057 
     [0.060]* [0.035]** [0.038]** 
Loan classification leniency (recipient)     0.025 0.024 0.021 
     [0.030]** [0.058]* [0.013]** 
Government bank ownership (recipient)     -0.361 -0.376 -0.355 
     [0.037]** [0.034]** [0.034]** 
Top 5 bank concentration (all banks) 
(recipient)     -0.208  -0.234 
     [0.016]**  [0.035]** 
Top 5 bank concentration (excl. foreign 
banks) (recipient)      -0.287  
      [0.016]**  
Bank size 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.016 
47 
 
 [0.130] [0.178] [0.118] [0.133] [0.042]** [0.168] [0.041]** 
Bank net income 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.023 0.039 0.038 0.057 
 [0.033]** [0.089]* [0.060]* [0.113] [0.171] [0.047]** [0.186] 
        
Creditor rights (source) -0.039 -0.034 -0.035 -0.032 -0.029 -0.038 -0.039 
 [0.090]* [0.058]* [0.069]* [0.022]** [0.026]** [0.036]** [0.029]** 
Creditor rights (recipient) 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.023 0.025 
 [0.083]* [0.060]* [0.057]* [0.046]** [0.095]* [0.063]* [0.069]* 
Info sharing (source) -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.034 -0.038 -0.030 
 [0.044]** [0.024]** [0.036]** [0.078]* [0.021]** [0.069]* [0.020]** 
Info sharing (recipient) 0.015 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.019 0.024 0.032 
 [0.087]* [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.086]* [0.069]* [0.037]** [0.011]** 
Property rights (source) -0.024 -0.025 -0.020 -0.028 -0.037 -0.037 -0.027 
 [0.053]* [0.043]** [0.008]*** [0.051]* [0.084]* [0.003]*** [0.078]* 
Property rights (recipient) 0.019 0.022 0.015 0.024 0.029 0.021 0.026 
 [0.062]* [0.036]** [0.029]** [0.093]* [0.043]** [0.068]* [0.019]** 
Fin liberalization (source)       0.039 
       [0.319] 
Fin liberalization (recipient)       0.044 
       [0.028]** 
Growth opportunity (source)       -0.317 
       [0.016]** 
Growth opportunity (recipient)       0.712 
       [0.018]** 
Source countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 
Recipient countries 111 111 108 109 103 103 70 
Banks 301 301 301 301 301 301 284 
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 33,110 33,110 32,207 32,508 30,702 30,702 19,596 
Note: The dependent variable for columns (1) to (5) and (7) is a dummy that takes the value of one if the bank 
headquartered in source country s has a foreign subsidiary in recipient country r, and is zero otherwise, in 2008. 
The dependent variable for column (6) is a dummy that takes the value of one if the bank headquartered in 
source country s has either a foreign subsidiary or a foreign branch in recipient country r, and is zero otherwise, 
in 2008. The estimation is via probit model. The explanatory variables are for year 2007. Bank size and net 
income are the 3-year average values over 2005-2007. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the 
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal 
effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable 
as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.   Other control variables include log income (source and recipient), 
log population (source and recipient), common language and log distance. P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in brackets. *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Figure 1. Changes of regulation and changes of credit inflows in recipient countries 
 
Note: This figure presents the non-parametric (kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing) plot of the changes in regulation of recipient countries on the X-axis, and 
changes in credit inflows on the Y-axis. The solid line is the fitted credit inflows with 95% confidence region (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) in dashed lines. Over3ar is overall 
activities restrictions for the banking sector, bonf is restriction on banks own non-financial firms, crindex is capital regulatory index, seaudit is strength of external audit, 
fstrans is financial statement transparency, indsa is independence of supervisory authority, ospower is official supervisory power, and loancs is loan classification leniency. 
Among 120 recipient countries in our sample, we find that 114 recipient countries/regions have changed at least one type of regulations during the past decade. 
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Fig 2. Changes of regulation and changes of credit outflows from source countries 
 
Note: This figure presents the non-parametric (kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing) plot of the changes in regulation of source countries on the X-axis, and changes 
in credit outflows on the Y-axis. The solid line is the fitted credit outflows with 95% confidence region (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) in dashed lines. Over3ar is overall activities 
restrictions for the banking sector, bonf is restriction on banks own non-financial firms, crindex is capital regulatory index, seaudit is strength of external audit, fstrans is 
financial statement transparency, indsa is independence of supervisory authority, ospower is official supervisory power, and loancs is loan classification leniency. Among 26 
source countries in our sample, we find that 21 countries/regions have changed at least one type of regulations during the past decade.
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Data Appendix  
Our main dependent variable used in this paper is the international bilateral bank flow from 26 
primarily OECD source countries22 to 120 recipient countries23. The bilateral bank flow consists of 
bank loans and portfolio investments aggregated from banks located in a source country to all sectors 
of the economy in a recipient country.  It is a panel dataset consists of bilateral country level data. 
Our bank flow panel data is constructed from the banking sector bilateral stock data published in 
the International Banking Statistics by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS 
Consolidated/Nationality Banking Statistics publish aggregate foreign financial claims reported by 
domestic bank head offices, including the exposures of their foreign affiliates (i.e. branches and 
subsidiaries), and are collected on a worldwide consolidated basis with inter-office positions being 
netted out (BIS, 2003, p.55). These claims consist of financial assets such as loans, debt securities, 
properties, and equities, including equity participations in subsidiaries (BIS, 2003). The data are 
published in Table 9B of the BIS Quarterly Review on a quarterly basis since December 1983 under 
the title “The consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks”. The data are in a matrix form with 
different source country/recipient country combinations. The most recent cross sectional data can be 
downloaded from http://www.bis.org/statistics/pcsv/panx9b.csv and the full historical data can be 
downloaded from the BIS website:  www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9b.csv 
 This database provides comprehensive data on banks’ financial claims extended on residents 
outside the country in which these banks are headquartered. It is important to stress that the bank’s 
home country is determined by the reporting bank’s nationality not its geographic location. So, for 
example, a loan issued by the US bank located in London to a British bank operating in London is 
                                                             
22 The 26 source countries/regions are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
23 The 120 recipient countries/regions are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, 
Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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recorded in the database as a foreign loan, where the source country is the US and the recipient 
country is the UK.  However, a loan issued by the same US bank located in London to another US 
bank located in New York is regarded as a domestic loan issued by the US bank and is therefore not 
recorded in this database (for details, see Wooldridge, 2002).  
For instance, if there was a huge US flow to their branches located in the UK but a lot of that 
flow was eventually headed towards emerging economies, the BIS data can actually capture the fact 
that these are indeed US bank inflows, rather than the UK bank inflows, to emerging economies. 
As there is no flow measure in the BIS data, we construct a bank flow measure by calculating the 
annual difference of log total foreign claims for each bilateral source-recipient combination.  
Specifically, our bank flow is defined as 100 times the log-difference of the ratio of total foreign 
claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). We construct the 
annual bank flow variable by using the stock data (FCsr) on December of each year in our sample 
period of 1996-2007 to match the annual frequency of the other explanatory variables. 
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Figure 1: the change of overall activities restrictions across countries (1999 vs. 2006) 
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Internet Appendix Table 1: Correlation matrix of differenced variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Δ Overall activities restrictions  1 
            
2 Δ Restriction on banks own nonfin firms  0.11** 1 
           3 Δ capital regulatory index  0.05 0.09 1 
          4 Δ strength of external audit  -0.09 0.01 0.21*** 1 
         5 Δ fin statement transparency  -0.06 0.11** 0.09 0.23*** 1 
        6 Δ Independence of supervisory authority  -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.09 1 
       7 Δ Official Supervisory Power  0.01 0.12** 0.03 0.22*** 0.20*** 0 1 
      8 Δ Loan classification leniency  -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.16*** 1 
     9 Δ Creditor rights  0.01 -0.12* 0.14** -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.1 1 
    10 Δ Info share  -0.19** -0.05 -0.01 0.12** 0.24*** 0.02 -0.01 0.25*** -0.06 1 
   11 Δ Property rights  -0.20** -0.13** -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.24*** 0.00 0.26*** 1 
  12 Δ Log income  -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.06 1 
 13 Δ Log population  -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.12** 1 
Note: This table examines the correlations among the changes of regulation and institution quality. The change of a variable is its difference between 2001 and 2004 and that 
between 2004 and 2007, that is, ∆xt, t=2004 and 2007. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Internet Appendix Table 2. Regulatory arbitrage and bank flows: various clustering effects 
 
1 2 3 
Clustering by two dimensions By recipient country and time 
By source country 
and time 
By recipient-source 
country pair and time 
Overall activities restrictions (source) 0.36 0.36 0.36 
 
[0.009]*** [0.017]** [0.016]** 
Overall activities restrictions (recipient) -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 
 
[0.018]** [0.015]** [0.029]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms (source) 1.52 1.52 1.52 
 
[0.029]** [0.023]** [0.028]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms (recipient) -1.42 -1.42 -1.42 
 
[0.144] [0.112] [0.116] 
capital regulatory index (source) 0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
[0.123] [0.128] [0.124] 
capital regulatory index (recipient) -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 
 
[0.028]** [0.025]** [0.025]** 
strength of external audit (source) 0.70 0.70 0.70 
 
[0.250] [0.136] [0.254] 
strength of external audit (recipient) -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 
 
[0.033]** [0.032]** [0.030]** 
fin statement transparency (source) 1.85 1.85 1.85 
 
[0.027]** [0.030]** [0.027]** 
fin statement transparency (recipient) -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 
 
[0.059]* [0.047]** [0.055]* 
Independence of Supervisory Authority (source) 1.05 1.05 1.05 
 
[0.461] [0.462] [0.423] 
Independence of Supervisory Authority (recipient) -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
 
[0.031]** [0.022]** [0.024]** 
Official Supervisory Power (source) 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 
[0.078]* [0.072]* [0.074]* 
Official Supervisory Power (recipient) -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 
 
[0.023]** [0.023]** [0.024]** 
Loan classification leniency (source) -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 
 
[0.020]** [0.011]** [0.015]** 
Loan classification leniency (recipient) 0.41 0.41 0.41 
 
[0.036]** [0.033]** [0.033]** 
Creditor rights (source) -2.40 -2.40 -2.40 
 
[0.018]** [0.012]** [0.019]** 
Creditor rights (recipient) 3.65 3.65 3.65 
 
[0.026]** [0.032]** [0.037]** 
Info sharing (source) -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 
 
[0.035]** [0.042]** [0.034]** 
Info sharing (recipient) 1.17 1.17 1.17 
 
[0.084]* [0.083]* [0.084]* 
No. of days to enforce contracts (recipient) 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
[0.036]** [0.082]* [0.038]** 
No. of days to enforce contracts (source) -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
 
[0.027]** [0.023]** [0.025]** 
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Top 5 bank concentration (recipient) -3.64 -3.64 -3.64 
 
[0.069]* [0.051]* [0.054]* 
Government bank ownership (recipient) -1.67 -1.67 -1.67 
 
[0.030]** [0.024]** [0.023]** 
Property rights (source) -2.44 -2.44 -2.44 
 
[0.034]** [0.036]** [0.033]** 
Property rights (recipient) 1.86 1.86 1.86 
 
[0.029]** [0.025]** [0.026]** 
Log income (source) -1.16 -1.16 -1.16 
 
[0.364] [0.365] [0.388] 
Log income (recipient) 2.11 2.11 2.11 
 
[0.112] [0.081]* [0.101] 
Log population (source) 1.60 1.60 1.60 
 
[0.120] [0.288] [0.135] 
Log population (recipient) 2.48 2.48 2.48 
 
[0.051]* [0.033]** [0.035]** 
Common language 5.40 5.40 5.40 
 
[0.007]*** [0.013]** [0.006]*** 
Log distance -1.38 -1.38 -1.38 
 
[0.277] [0.128] [0.218] 
Fin liberalization (source) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
 
[0.193] [0.341] [0.197] 
Fin liberalization (recipient) 0.52 0.52 0.52 
 
[0.012]** [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Growth opportunity (source) -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 
 
[0.029]** [0.022]** [0.030]** 
Growth opportunity  (recipient) 1.67 1.67 1.67 
 
[0.030]** [0.028]** [0.029]** 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes 
Recipient country fixed effect yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes 
Observations 7,923 7,923 7,923 
No. of source countries 23 23 23 
No. of recipient countries 70 70 70 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: This table presents robustness tests for equation 7 in Table 4 of the main text under different two-way 
clustering specifications for standard errors of coefficients indicated in the first row (Petersen 2009). The 
dependent variable is bank flows, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of total foreign claims (FCsr) 
from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered under different specifications and are presented in brackets. 
The country level banking regulatory variables are time varying and are based on three major surveys spanning 
almost over a decade by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). The values of regulatory variables 
for the period of 1996 to 1999 are taken from the first survey recorded in 1998/1999. Their values for the period 
of 2000 to 2003 are taken from the second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of the end of 2002. 
Their values for the period of 2004 to 2005 are taken from the third survey that was sought a characterization of 
the environment as of the end of 2005. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table 1. Time fixed effects, 
as well as source and recipient country specific effects are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Internet Appendix Table 3: Regulatory Gaps and International Bank Flows 
Estimation: As a robustness test, we calculate the regulatory gaps between each source and recipient 
country, and use these as alternative explanatory variables. Specifically, we estimate the following 
model: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 + β  𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 + γ ∆𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡                           +𝜃𝜃1 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵�𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟� + 𝜃𝜃2𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 + η𝐼𝐼 + 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡    (1) 
where,     ∆Xs,r,t = Xs,t – Xr,t,  (2) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡            (3)        𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡     (4) 
s and r indicate the source and recipient country, respectively, and t indicates time (year).   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall activities restrictions (gap) 0.38 
   
0.50 0.57 
 
[0.033]** 
   
[0.023]** [0.018]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms (gap) 0.48 
   
0.50 0.36 
 
[0.017]** 
   
[0.011]** [0.014]** 
capital regulatory index (gap)   0.89 
  
0.75 0.85 
 
  [0.067]* 
  
[0.032]** [0.035]** 
strength of external audit (gap)   
 
0.46 
 
0.35 0.36 
 
  
 
[0.017]** 
 
[0.066]* [0.077]* 
fin statement transparency (gap)   
 
0.81 
 
0.78 0.92 
 
  
 
[0.031]** 
 
[0.033]** [0.028]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority - 
Overall (gap)   
  
0.92 0.58 0.63 
 
  
  
[0.033]** [0.047]** [0.032]** 
Official Supervisory Power (gap)   
  
0.29 0.30 0.24 
 
  
  
[0.033]** [0.034]** [0.044]** 
Loan classification leniency (gap)   
   
-0.51 -0.67 
 
  
   
[0.029]** [0.025]** 
Creditor rights (gap) -4.53 -4.46 -4.37 -4.28 -4.41 -5.36 
 
[0.046]** [0.012]** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** 
Info share (gap) -1.14 -1.12 -1.14 -1.11 -1.19 -1.48 
 
[0.024]** [0.065]* [0.026]** [0.027]** [0.023]** [0.040]** 
Property rights (gap) -1.67 -1.83 -1.93 -2.11 -1.60 -1.74 
 
[0.064]* [0.062]* [0.053]* [0.028]** [0.039]** [0.043]** 
Fin liberalization (gap) 
     
0.49 
      
[0.189] 
Growth opportunity (gap) 
     
-1.46 
      
[0.038]** 
Sample period 1996-2007 1996-2005 
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Recipient country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 13,738 13,790 13,467 13,601 12,936 7,923 
No. of source countries 26 26 26 26 26 23 
No. of recipient countries 111 111 108 109 102 70 
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.22 
Note: The dependent variable is bank flows, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of the total foreign 
claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). P-values are computed by 
the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in brackets.  *, 
**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Internet Appendix Table 4: Change Regressions 
Estimation: We examine the effects of regulatory changes on international bank flow changes. 
Focusing on changes allows us to account for unobservable time-invariant country specific 
characteristics that might influence both the level of bank regulation and international bank flows. 
This approach also helps alleviate the endogeneity concern (Lin et al., 2011).   
The first differencing estimation relates to the time periods corresponding to the three surveys.    
Specifically, we examine how changes in the regulatory gap (between the source and recipient pairs) 
influence changes in bank flows.  Instead of using the full ten years of data, we focus on the three 
survey years (1999, 2002, 2005) to measure the regulatory changes. To capture the potential lagged 
effects of regulatory changes, we use bank flow data in years 2001, 2004, and 2007 data to measure 
the changes in bank flows. The sample thus contains observations of two time series changes. The 
countries without regulatory changes are dropped from the estimation and the sample size drops to 
about 1730. Specifically, the estimation can be expressed as follows: 
∆�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 ∆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾1∆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛾𝛾2∆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡  + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 ,𝑡𝑡  ,      for 𝑡𝑡 = 2 and 3          (5)            
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Δ  Overall activities restrictions (gap) 0.46 
   
0.43 0.51 
 
[0.031]** 
   
[0.035]** [0.031]** 
Δ  Restriction on banks own nonfin firms (gap) 0.75 
   
0.62 0.48 
 
[0.045]** 
   
[0.041]** [0.053]* 
Δ  capital regulatory index (gap)   3.68 
  
3.53 3.24 
 
  [0.015]** 
  
[0.018]** [0.016]** 
Δ  strength of external audit (gap)   
 
0.98 
 
0.81 0.59 
 
  
 
[0.034]** 
 
[0.039]** [0.047]** 
Δ  fin statement transparency (gap)   
 
1.12 
 
1.10 1.15 
 
  
 
[0.029]** 
 
[0.037]** [0.052]* 
Δ  Independence of Supervisory Authority - Overall 
(gap)   
  
2.78 2.81 3.00 
 
  
  
[0.060]* [0.062]* [0.059]* 
Δ   Official Supervisory Power (gap)   
  
0.15 0.34 0.46 
 
  
  
[0.022]** [0.016]** [0.015]** 
Δ  Loan classification leniency (gap)   
   
-0.36 -0.47 
 
  
   
[0.028]** [0.016]** 
Δ  Creditor rights (gap) -3.08 -3.14 -3.02 -3.27 -2.81 -3.52 
 
[0.013]** [0.019]** [0.075]* [0.020]** [0.026]** [0.020]** 
Δ  Info share (gap) -1.82 -2.04 -1.51 -2.42 -1.63 -1.49 
 
[0.034]** [0.026]** [0.040]** [0.018]** [0.039]** [0.052]* 
Δ  Property rights (gap) -2.09 -2.06 -2.23 -2.06 -2.11 -1.53 
 
[0.130] [0.039]** [0.053]* [0.044]** [0.038]** [0.047]** 
Δ  Log income (gap) -2.73 -2.73 -2.82 -2.60 -2.73 -3.14 
 
[0.038]** [0.046]** [0.201] [0.083]* [0.075]* [0.063]* 
Δ  Log population (gap) 3.65 3.28 4.50 3.74 4.41 5.31 
 
[0.143] [0.230] [0.111] [0.064]* [0.062]* [0.036]** 
Δ Fin liberalization (gap)   
    
0.15 
 
  
    
[0.347] 
Δ Growth opportunity (gap)   
    
-0.34 
 
  
    
[0.039]** 
Observations 1,731 1,701 1,673 1,673 1,639 1,081 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.18 
Note: The regressions examine the effects of the changes of regulatory and institutional gaps on changes of bank 
inflows. The dependent variable is the difference of bank flows between 2001 and 2004 and that between 2004 
and 2007, i.e., Δyt, t=2007 and 2004, where y is the bank flows defined as 100 times the log-difference of the 
ratio of total foreign claims (FCsr) from source country s to recipient country r, that is, 100*∆ln(FCsr). All 
explanatory variables are lagged two years changes in regulation gaps between source and recipient countries 
(i.e. difference of regulatory gaps between 1999 and 2002 and that between 2002 and 2005). P-values are 
computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in 
brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Internet Appendix Table 5: The current account analysis 
Estimation: Here we follow the traditional intertemporal approach to the current account (see, for 
example, a survey by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) on this research). It has been developed to address 
the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) saving-investment paradox of home bias in real investment (Sachs 
(1981)), and is related current “global savings glut” debate. We adopt a parsimonious version of this 
model documented in Tesar (1991) and Kraay and Ventura (2002).  
 
The traditional regression model is given as follows: (6) 
CAit = α0 + α Sit + uit     (6) 
where CAit and Sit are the current account/GNP and gross saving/GNP of country i respectively, α0 
and α are parameters, and uit is residual. The parameters α provides a measure of the response of the 
current account to the changes in saving, which in turn, implies the amount of capital outflow from 
the country. We augment this simple model of the determinants of current account by a full set of key 
regulatory variables and other controls from our bank flow model as follows: 
CAit = α0 + α Sit + β Regulationit + γ Controlit + uit      (7) 
where Regulationit and Controlit are, respectively, a vector of regulatory variables and a vector of 
other control variables used in the previous bank flow analysis.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saving/GNP (%) (source) 0.79 0.78 0.64 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.72 
 
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** 
Overall activities restrictions (source) 
 
0.30 
   
0.49 0.58 
  
[0.016]** 
   
[0.031]** [0.026]** 
Restriction on banks own nonfin firms 
(source) 
 
1.41 
   
1.31 1.16 
  
[0.078]* 
   
[0.014]** [0.008]*** 
capital regulatory index (source) 
  
0.25 
  
0.35 0.57 
   
[0.035]** 
  
[0.126] [0.072]* 
strength of external audit (source) 
   
0.74 
 
0.63 1.15 
    
[0.034]** 
 
[0.243] [0.121] 
fin statement transparency (source) 
   
1.48 
 
1.56 1.53 
    
[0.018]** 
 
[0.023]** [0.019]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority 
(source) 
    
0.53 0.71 0.96 
     
[0.092]* [0.605] [0.454] 
Official Supervisory Power (source) 
    
0.96 0.91 0.81 
     
[0.160] [0.057]* [0.028]** 
Loan classification leniency (source) 
     
-0.50 -0.36 
      
[0.015]** [0.016]** 
Creditor rights (source) 
 
-3.32 -2.83 -2.55 -2.50 -2.47 -2.44 
  
[0.025]** [0.154] [0.061]* [0.137] [0.032]** [0.041]** 
Info sharing (source) 
 
-1.73 -2.30 -1.56 -1.32 -1.13 -1.44 
  
[0.026]** [0.017]** [0.019]** [0.113] [0.004]*** [0.017]** 
No. of days to enforce contracts (source) 
     
0.18 0.17 
      
[0.015]** [0.023]** 
Property rights (source) 
 
-3.68 -4.90 -3.77 -3.98 -4.13 -4.51 
  
[0.065]* [0.044]** [0.072]* [0.062]* [0.037]** [0.021]** 
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Fin liberalization (source) 
      
0.51 
       
[0.161] 
Growth opportunity (source) 
      
-1.32 
  
      
[0.027]** 
Sample period 1996-20007 1996-2005 
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Source country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,125 1,090 1,102 1,033 610 
Adj. R-squared 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.85 
No. of source countries 104 104 104 101 102 96 67 
Note: The dependent variable is the current account/GNP (in %), which is a proxy for aggregate capital 
outflows from the source countries in the sample. The country level banking regulatory variables are time 
varying and are based on three major surveys spanning almost over a decade by the World Bank. Detailed 
variable definitions can be found in Table 1. Other control variables include log income (source) and log 
population (source). Time fixed effects and source country specific effects are included in the regressions but 
not reported. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for source 
countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Internet Appendix Table 6: Difference of number of foreign subsidiaries in highly regulated 
versus low regulation countries 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cell 
 
High 
regulation 
countries 
No. of 
obs 
Low 
regulation 
countries 
No. 
of 
obs 
Difference 
= (1)-(3) 
1 Bank size below median & low profitability 1.31 23 1.26 42 0.05 
2 Bank size below median & high profitability 3.68 41 1.98 44 1.71*  
3 Bank size above median & low profitability 8.74 36 6.13 49 2.61** 
4 Bank size above median & high profitability 9.41 34 6.25 32 3.16** 
 
Note: This table test the difference of number of foreign subsidiaries in highly regulated versus low 
regulation countries according to the size and profitability of the banks. Bank size is measured by total 
assets and profitability is measured by net income divided by total assets. Both are three-year 
averages. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
For the matching estimation: 
1) For each of the 26 source countries, we create dummy variable related to each of the eight 
supervision and regulation measures used in our previous analysis.  For each dummy variable, we 
assigned a value of 1 to countries which have a more stringent regulation relative to the sample 
median. We then construct the overall regulation index as the sum of these eight dummy variables.  
Thus, this overall measure ranges from 0 to 8 with a higher value indicating a higher level of bank 
regulation. We divide 26 source countries into two groups of high/low regulation according to the 
overall regulation index of each country being above or below the medium level of the index. 
2) divide 26 source countries into two groups of high/low regulation according to the overall 
regulation index of each country being above or below the medium level of the index. 
3) divide all 301 banks from the 26 source countries into big/small banks according to their size and 
high/low profitable banks according to their profitability in comparison to the respective medians. 
This gives us a total of 4 cells. 
4) For the 4 cells, conduct four t-tests to see within each cell if banks located in highly regulated 
countries have more oversea subsidiaries than banks located in less regulated countries. 
 
